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Religion in the Public Schools: A
Proposed Constitutional Standard
The place of religion in the public schools is only one
aspect of the problem of Church-State separation, but if
the emotional response following last year's United States
Supreme Court decision in the Regents' Prayer Case is
any indication, it is an important one. In this Article, Pro-
fessor Choper proposes that, for purposes of testing the
constitutional validity of religious activity in the public
schools, the first amendment's establishment clause is vio-
lated whenever the state engages in "solely religious ac-
tivity that is likely to result in (1) compromising the
student's religious or concientious beliefs or (2) influ-
encing the student's freedom of religious or conscien-
tious choice." After analyzing a number of precedents,
Professor Choper applies this standard to various situa-
tions that involve religious activity in the public schools;
he concludes that the price of abolishing certain religious
influences in the schools must be paid to protect religious
liberty.
Jesse H. Choper*
Thirteen years ago, Father John Courtney Murray stated: "No
one who knows a bit about the literature on separation of church
and state, that for centuries has poured out in all languages, will
be inclined to deny that hardly another problem in the religious
or political order has received so much misconceived and deform-
ed statement, with the result that the number of bad philosophies
in the matter is, like the scriptural number of fools, infinite."' Per-
haps Father Murray would similarly evaluate the writing that has
*Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
wishes to express his gratitude to Dean William B. Lockhart and to his
colleagues, Professors Yale Kamisar, Robert J. Levy, and Terrance Sanda-
low, for their valuable suggestions in preparing this Article. He also wishes
to thank Stephen I. Dokken, of the second year class, for his helpful research
assistance.
1. Murray, Lav or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CONTEMPI. PROD. 23
(1949).
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appeared since 1949. Whether or not one agrees with his judg-
ment on the merits of the literature, no one would deny that the
quantity of discussion is indeed overpowering. With the Supreme
Court's recent decision in the Regents' Prayer Case,' it is inevitable
that much more will be forthcoming. This term, the Court has
already indicated that it will take a more active role in resolving
church-state conflicts.3 Perhaps the wiser course would be to heed
the warning implicit in Father Murray's comment. No doubt, many
men of wisdom have declined to express themselves on this is-
sue "so likely to generate heat rather than light." 4 But light, in
the form of principled standards to determine the constitutional-
ity, under the first and fourteenth amendments, of the multitude
of church-state problems inherent in a democracy such as ours,
is sorely needed.
The constitutional standard to be developed in this article is
not suggested as a solution for every type of church-state conflict.
Rather, it is to be confined to a narrow but exceedingly important
segment of the question. The two drives that give rise to the great-
est current constitutional controversies regarding the church-state
separation commanded by the first amendment, according to Mr.
Justice Rutledge,5 involve the use of the public schools to foster
religion and the procurement of public funds to support parochial
schools. This article will deal only with the first area.
The proposed constitutional standard is that for problems con-
cerning religious intrusion in the public schools, the establishment
clause of the first amendment is violated when the state engages
in what may be fairly characterized as solely religious activity
that is likely to result in (1) compromising the student's religious
or conscientious beliefs or (2) influencing the student's freedom
of religious or conscientious choice.6
2. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3. On October 8, 1962, the Court agreed to hear argument in two cases
presenting the issue of the validity of daily Bible reading in the public
schools. Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris.
noted, 371 U.S. 807 (1962); Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d
698, cert. granted, 371 U.S. 809 (1962).
4. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1961).
5. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (dissenting opin-
ion).
6. Use of the phrase "public schools" is meant to encompass all kinder-
garten, elementary, and high schools maintained under governmental au-
thority and control. The word "state" is used to designate all that is included
[Vol. 47: 329330
RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD
A. SOME SETTLED PROPOSITIONS
Certain preliminary issues must be disposed of at the outset.
First, the Supreme Court has decisively settled that the first amend-
ment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"
has been made wholly applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment.7 Although the history, logic, and desirability, of this
thesis have been articulately questioned,' the Court's consistent
position renders further discussion unprofitable. Second, the Court
has unequivocally rejected the proposition that the purpose of the
within the concept of state action under the fourteenth amendment. See
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This would cover not only the
state legislature and executive, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879),
but also all administrative agencies, Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), political subdivisions, Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939), and individuals (such as school principals and teachers)
acting under color of state authority. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
7. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421,423,430 (1962).
The first part of the first amendment will hereinafter be referred to as
the "establishment clause"; the second part, as the "free exercise clause."
8. Howe, The Constitutional Question, in RELIGION AND THE FREE So-
CIETY 49 (1958). The essence of Professor Howe's position is that the lan-
guage of the fourteenth amendment that "no State shall ... deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" indicates that
its intention was only to bar the states from infringing on those rights that
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937). By virtue of the fourteenth amendment, the states
not only are forbidden to deny that liberty that is protected by the free
exercise clause, but also are powerless to give any aid to religion that would
significantly impair the intellectual or spiritual liberties of individuals. The
establishment clause, however, may be read to bar many federal aids to
religion that do not appreciably affect individual liberties-for example,
the granting of tax exemptions to churches and the public schools' permitting
the gift of Bibles to willingly receptive pupils. The fourteenth amendment
should not be read to prohibit the states from extending these aids to religion.
In answer, it might be suggested that some of the aids to religion that
Professor Howe finds to have little impact on the secured rights of individ-
uals-for example, the distribution of Bibles in the public schools-may
well have substantial impact. See text accompanying note 509 infra. Fur-
thermore, even those aids to religion that have no immediate effect on in-
dividual liberty-for example, financial assistance to religion in the form of
tax exemption or, for that matter, a direct appropriation to a particular
church-historically and logicaly have tended to cause so much strife among
religious sects as to ultimately endanger individual liberty. See Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11, 53-54 (1947).
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establishment clause is only to forbid governmental preference of
one religion over another.9 Despite heated (and often intemperate)
argument to the contrary,1" the establishment clause bars certain
governmental aids to religion even if impartially afforded to all
religious sects." Finally, the Court has firmly determined that
the ban of the establishment clause extends beyond the setting up
of a state church,'" a proposition with which there has been re-
latively little disagreement.
B. AIMS OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD
Although it has been suggested that "it is not reason but history
that must be consulted"' 3 to determine what is right and proper
in the field of church-state relations, such a dichotomy neither
can nor should be drawn. The precise intentions of the framers of
the first amendment are surely of great importance, but scholarly
investigation has produced antithetic conclusions.' 4 The desirable
course is to frame a principle for constitutional adjudication that
is not only grounded in the history and language of the first amend-
9. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948).
10. E.g., O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITU-
TION (1949); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 9-16 (1949); Murray, supra note 1, at 23. Dis-
agreement with the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause is not
limited to nonjudicial commentators. Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida
decided that it was
not impressed with the language quoted [from four Supreme Court
decisions] as being definitive of the "establishment" clause. It goes far
beyond the purpose and intent of the authors and beyond any reason-
able application to the practical facts of every day life in this country.
We feel that the broad language quoted must, in the course of time,
be further receded from, if weight is to be accorded the true purpose
of the First Amendment.
Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd., 143 So. 2d 21, 24-25 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962).
See also id. at 28; Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 179-82, 100 N.E.2d
463, 472-73 (1951) (concurring opinion); 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 495, 499
(1962).
11. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
492-93, 495 (1961).
12. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213
(1948) (concurring opinion); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442
(1961).
13. Herberg, Religion, Democracy, and Public Education, in RELIOON
IN AMERICA 118, 142 (Cogley ed. 1958).
14. Compare the opinions in Everson v. Board v. Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947), with the authorities cited in note 10 supra. Compare Pfeffer, Church
and State: Something Less Than Separation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1951 ),
with PARsoNs, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1948). See also Kurland, The Regents'
Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury Signifying .... " 1962 SUPREME
COURT REV. 1, 22-25.
[Vol. 47: 329
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ment,15 but one that is also capable of consistent application to
the relevant problems.' 6 When applied, the principle should take
into account those values now cherished in our society"7 and
should not produce decidedly farfetched or unacceptable results."8
The last criterion is particularly crucial in the emotionally-charged
area of religion in the public schools.
The proposed constitutional standard attempts to meet these
requirements. If there are any points of general agreement in the
field of church-state relationships, they are that probably the para-
mount purpose for the enactment of the establishment clause was
to safeguard freedom of worship and conscience,' and that the
protection of religious liberty remains our society's major con-
cern in the church-state sphere.2 ° By stressing the security of re-
ligious and conscientious scruples of public school children, the
proposed standard attempts to fulfill both the predominant histori-
15. Cf. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised Opinion, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
16. See LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 43-44 (1951). But see 51 GEO.
L. J. 185 (1962).
17. Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HAnv. L. REv. 1, 31-32 (1959).
18. Cf. Henkin, supra note 15, at 477.
19. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962) (Black, J.);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (Douglas, J.); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (Black, J.), 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting): O'NEILL, op. cit. supra note 10 at 96; PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE,
AND FREEDOM 122 (1953); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality,
20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426, 428 (1953); Kurland, supra note 4, at 4; Murray,
supra note 1, at 32; 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 202 (1962).
20. See, e.g., Butts, The Relation Between Religion and Education, 33
PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 140, 141 (1956): "This movement [from the latter
part of the 18th century to the early 20th century] toward separation of
church and state in education was undertaken in order to preserve free-
dom for all." Johnson, Religion and Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDUCA-
TIoN 143, 145 (1956): "[P]rotection of religious liberty is the beginning
and the end of the separation of church and state." Katz, supra note 19, at
436, points out that "fear of the Roman Catholic church as a potential threat
to religious freedom" probably explains the strict separationist position of
those who oppose government aid to religion, such as financial assistance to
parochial schools, that seemingly does not result in an impairment of
religious liberty. On the other hand, those who attack the strict separation-
ist position on such issues as financial aid to parochial education and public
school released time do so on the ground that complete separation violates
the religious liberty of those who attend parochial schools or who wish to
participate in released time. See, e.g., Bishops of the United States, The
Place of the Private and Church-Related Schools in American Education, 33
PRoGRESSIvE EDuCATioN 152 (1956); Hayes, The Constitutional Permissi-
bility of the Participation of Church-Related Schools in the Administration's
Proposed Program of Massive Federal Aid to Education, 11 DEPAUL L.
REV. 161, 162 (1962); Reed, Church-State and the Zorach Case, 27 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 529, 540 (1952); Slough & McAnany, Government Aid to
Church-Related Schools: An Analysis, 11 KAN. L. REV. 35, 72 (1962).
1963]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:329
cal and contemporary concerns with religious freedom. It prohibits
certain governmental action that is likely to result in (1) a stu-
dent's doing something that is forbidden by his conscientious be-
liefs, thus compromising his scruples or (2) a student's engaging
in religious activities that, although not contrary to his religion's
beliefs, he would not otherwise undertake, thus influencing his
freedom of religious participation or choice. The results the pro-
posed standard produces seem to me to be, for the most part,
favorable; those that are not are nonetheless acceptable.
C. DELIMITATION OF THE AREA AND DEFINITION OF SOLELY
RELIGIoUs ACTIVITY
Many writers have considered the problems of religious infiltra-
tion in the public schools and financial aid by government to re-
ligious schools to be subject to singular treatment.2' Some have
concluded that the result of both is to "aid" religion, and there-
fore, both must be measured by the same standard." The conten-
tion that both "aid" religion is indisputable, but it cannot follow
that "aid to religion" is the constitutional determinant. 23 If it were,
few governmental activities could withstand constitutional attack.2
21. E.g., Corwin, Supra note 10, at 5; Pfeffer, Religion, Education and
the Constitution, 8 LAW. GUILD REV. 387 (1948); Sullivan, Religious Edu-
cation in the Schools, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 92, 109, 111 (1949);
Pfeffer, The New York Regents' Prayer Case (Engel v. Vitale): Its Back-
ground, Meaning and Implications, Committee on Law and Social Action
Reports 6 (American Jewish Congress June 26, 1962). For a rather intem-
perate criticism of the Supreme Court's failure to so treat these questions,
see Comment, 9 OHio ST. L.J. 336, 340 (1948).
22. E.g., Boyer, Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wiscon-
sin, 1953 WIs. L. REV. 181, 240; Note, I J. PUB. L. 212, 216 (1952).
23. The source of the confusion is undoubtedly the famous dictum of
Mr. Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947):
"Neither [a state nor the federal government] can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." The dictum
was repeated by the Court in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443
(1961); and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1961). It has been
discussed in virtually all of the church-state literature since Everson. Cur-
iously, Mr. Justice Black made no reference to this dictum in Engel v.
Vitale.
24. The public fire and police protection afforded parochial schools
undeniably "aid" them. The closing of public schools each Saturday and
Sunday, which enables Christian and Jewish children to attend their respec-
tive churches and synagogues, clearly "aids" attendance at religious services.
The best evidence that the Court never intended the phrase "aid to re-
ligion," as commonly understood, to be the constitutional determinant,
but rather considers "aid" to be a word of art (perhaps poorly chosen),
is that in the first two decisions in which the phrase was used, the Court
reached opposite conclusions despite the fact that both situations obviously
resulted in "aid" to religion. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
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Nor, when more objective standards are available,' is it satis-
factory merely to say that the question of what kinds of "aid" are
constitutional and what kinds are not "is one of degree.
2 0
Various forms of public financial assistance to parochial educa-
tion are permissible under the first amendment because such as-
sistance, despite its resultant aid to religion, has the accomplish-
ment of a nonreligious public purpose - as an independent pri-
mary goal, as distinguished from a dependent derivative goal.'
Thus, the use of tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial
school pupils was upheld by the Supreme Court as "public wel-
fare legislation" protecting "children going to and from church
schools from the very real hazards of traffic. '29 Likewise, the ar-
gument, whatever its merit, for the constitutional inclusion of re-
ligiously affiliated schools in any federal program providing fi-
nancial assistance for elementary and secondary school buildings
and teachers' salaries is that such government support "confers
directly and substantially a benefit to citizen education,"'  and
that such an end is within the legitimate scope of federal con-
cern.3 Although these governmental programs aid religion, they
may not be fairly characterized as solely religious activities. How-
ever, other practices, such as prayer recitation and Bible reading,
must be fairly characterized as solely religious activities having no
independent primary nonreligious purpose. Their exclusive pri-
mary goal is to inculcate the students with religious and spiritual
ideals or to assist in such inculcation.
(upholding the use of public funds to transport children to parochial
schools); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(invalidating religious instruction during released time in the public schools).
25. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725(1961), in which the Court treated the problem of what is sufficient state
involvement in private action to constitute state action as a question of de-
gree only "because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned."
26. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (Douglas, J.).
27. See, e.g., 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 198, 200 (1951); 3 RUTGERS L. REV.
115, 119-21 (1949). The aid obtained by religion is often referred to as
being merely "incidental."
28. See text accompanying notes 31-37 infra.
29. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1947).
30. National Catholic Welfare Conference, The Constitutionality of
the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education, 50
GEO. L... 397, 422 (1961).
31. For other instances of the use of this position, see Opinion of the
Justices, 99 N.H. 519, 113 A.2d 114 (1955); Schade v. Allegheny County
Institution Dist., 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956); Slough & MeAnany,
supra note 20, at 62-64. See also Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd., 281 U.S.
370 (1930). Evaluation of this thesis is beyond the scope of this article.
Since the governmental action with which it deals may not be fairly char-
acterized as "solely religious," it falls outside the constitutional standard
proposed herein and is subject to independent consideration.
1963]
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Contentions proclaiming a public purpose for these solely re-
ligious activities are numerous. It has been argued that their in-
tention is to combat juvenile delinquency among American
youth;32 to teach "tolerance, love of fellow men, kindness, respon-
sibility for the welfare of others";33 to prevent rape and other
crimes ;34 and to develop "deep and intelligent convictions" in our
children. 5 It has even been suggested that since failure to engage
in these practices causes upset and disturbed community reaction,
the prevention of such situations is a secular justification for having
the religious exercises.3 6
But these arguments ignore the crucial point. The results that
follow from the introduction of religion into the public schools are
unimportant. What is relevant is the fact that if such effects are
produced, they come about only if the primary goal-the im-
planting of spiritual and religious beliefs-is achieved; the purport-
ed seculars ends are derivative from the exclusively religious end. 7
Perhaps governmental aid to parochial education may be
constitutionally justified on the ground that, despite the fact that
aid to religion is a necessary effect, an equally necessary effect
is the promotion of a secular goal. But to uphold the constitution-
ality of religious incursions into public education on the basis of
their alleged secular benefits, despite the fact that they are merely
derived from the sole necessary effect of advancing religion not
only opens "the doctrinal floodgates for infinitely greater aid to
religion,"3 but literally reads the establishment clause out of the
first amendment. 9 Such incursions "employ Religion as an en-
gine of Civil policy."4 If the instilling of moral, ethical, and spir-
itual values will sustain these solely religious practices,41 there
32. Brief for the Board of Regents of the University of the State of
New York as Amicus Curiae, p. 14, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
See also Gordon v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 474, 178 P.2d
488, 494 (Ct. App. 1947).
33. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 108.
34. W. S. Fleming, quoted in PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 300-01.
35. Chairman of New York University Department of Religious Ed-
ucation, quoted in Boyer, supra note 22, at 232.
36. See Lieberman, A General Interpretation of Separation of Church
and State and Its Implications for Public Education, 33 PROGRESSivE ED-
UCATION 129, 132 (1956).
37. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., separate opinion); Note, 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 121 (1949).
38. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1114, 1120 (1948).
39. See generally Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16 RUToERS
L. REV. 735, 746-47 (1962).
40. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, para. 5, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67
(1947).
41. The argument that this is the saving "public purpose" has been made
(Vol. 47: 329
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would seem to be no reason why a government could not subsidize
the church that it feels best inculcates its members with these
qualities.4"
Nor is it a solution to judge these solely religious activities by
balancing the public benefit derived against the quantum of aid
extended to religion.43 This test may have some value in the case
of governmental action that results directly in both secular and
religious benefit, but when the public benefit is derivative-when
it is secured only after the religious inculcation is achieved-the
secular benefit will always vary directly with the religious benefit,
and any balancing is logically impossible.
The reasons calling for separate treatment of the problem of
religious activities in the public schools and the problem of finan-
cial aid to parochial education are also applicable in severing the
former from that presented by other governmental activity that
allegedly violates the establishment clause, but has an independent
primary nonreligious purpose." Also, since children of elemen-
tary and high school age are far less mature and intellectually
developed than the public generally,45 since they are particular-
ly unable to evaluate conflicting religious beliefs objectively,' 6
since they are especially susceptible to being influenced in reli-
gious choice,47 and since they are compelled by law to attend the
by Creel, Is It Legal for the Public Schools of Alabama to Provide an Elective
Course in Non-Sectarian Bible Instruction, 10 ALA. LAw. 86, 95 (1949);
Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 24, 47
(1952); Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61, 67 (1949). See also Hart v. School Dist.,
2 Lancaster L. Rev. 346, 352 (Pa. C.P. 1885). The writer in 30 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 509 (1962), asserts: "It would seem quite arbitrary for the Supreme
Court to hold that a general day of rest and relaxation served a public
purpose but the acknowledgement of a God by people 'whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being' was not a public purpose."
42. Professor Kauper suggests this result, although somewhat more
cautiously: "Moreover, the notion that government can directly aid religion
in order to bolster morale suggests implications of a wider use of public
moneys in direct aid of religion." Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom:
A Review, 52 MicH. L. REV. 829, 837 (1954). See also Pfeiffer v. Board of
Educ., 118 Mich. 560, 578, 77 N.W. 250, 257 (1898) (dissenting opinion).
43. See Note, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 516, 529 (1949); 57 YALE LJ.
1114, 1120-21 (1948).
44. E.g. Sunday closing laws (see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961)); appropriations to hospital, maintained under religious auspices,
for treating indigent patients (see Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899)).
45. Cf. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 423; Cosway & Toepfer,
Religion and the Schools, 17 U. Crc. L. Rnv. 117, 137 (1948); Comment,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 888, 893 (1955). Possible distinctions between ele-
mentary school children and high school pupils will be discussed infra.
46. Cf. 16 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 556, 559 (1948).
47. Cf. 25 CAL. Ops. AT'Y GEN. 324 (1955); Cushman, The Holy
3371963]
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site of these religious practices,48 there is a sound basis for giving
distinctive treatment to solely religious practices in the public
schools instead of treating them together with similar practices exist-
ing in our society generally.49
D. THE REGENTS' PRAYER CASE
In 1951, the New York State Board of Regents, the govern-
mental agency that supervises the state's public school system,
composed and recommended to all local school boards the follow-
ing prayer: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence up-
on Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our country."" ° In 1958, the New Hyde Park Board
of Education instructed all teachers that the prayer be recited
aloud by each class at the beginning of every school day. An ac-
tion in the state courts was instituted by parents of attending
students, who were Jewish, Ethical Culturists, Unitarians, or non-
believers,5 asserting, inter alia, that the practice should cease be-
cause it violated the establishment clause. 2 Their claims were re-
jected at all state levels,53 although it was made clear that ob-
jecting students had the right not to participate.5 The Supreme
Court reversed in Engel v. Vitale,5 holding the practice to be
contrary to the establishment clause, a ruling that "aroused more
public controversy than any decision since Brown v. Board of
Education.""8
Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 496 (1955); Kalven,
A Commemorative Case Note, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 505, 518 (1960); 74
HARV. L. REV. 611, 614 (1961).
48. Cf. Sutherland, Public Authority and Religious Education: A Brief
Survey of Constitutional and Legal Limits, in THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 45 (Brown ed. 1958).
49. Such practices include chaplains in both houses of Congress and
in state legislative assemblies and the opening prayer in the United States
Supreme Court: "God save the United States and this Honorable Court."
50. Its use was recommended at the commencement of each school day in
conjunction with the pledge of allegiance to the flag. Record, p. 28, Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
51. Id. at 12.
52. Other claims presented were that the free exercise clause was violated,
that a similar clause of the state constitution, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3, was
violated, and that the Board of Education had exceeded its statutory power.
Id. at 16-17.
53. Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1960), a/i'd 10 N.Y.2d
174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961) (Dye, J., & Fuld, J. dis-
senting).
54. 18 Misc. 2d 659, 696, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 492-93 (1959).
55. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
56. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 1038 (1962). The decision was announced on June
25, 1962. Reference to any newspaper or periodical of the time will bear out
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At the outset, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court,"7 char-
acterized the recitation of the Regents' prayer as "a religious ac-
tivity."m That it was a solely religious activity, having no inde-
pendent primary nonreligious purpose, is beyond dispute.59 Ex-
amination of the remainder of the opinion, however, leaves some-
what unclear the precise basis and extent of the decision. There is
language indicating that the decision holds no more than that the
evil in the situation was the fact that a governmental agency had
taken it upon itself to compose an official prayer for use in the
public schools.6"
the Law Week characterization. Many, if not most of the attacks on the
case were emotionally oriented and were founded on a basic misunderstand-
ing (unintentional or otherwise) of the decision. Those who found it polit-
ically expedient to denounce the "ruling against God" did so, without
pausing to learn whether the Court so ruled. Long-time critics of the Court
exploited the opportunity to heap further abuse, without regard to the
limitations stated in the reasoning and language of the case. For a discussion
of this criticism, see Choper, What Did Court Really Rule on Prayer,
Minneapolis Star, Sept. 15, 1962, p. 6A, col. 5. See generally Kurland,
The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying .. i.n" 
1962 SUPREME COURT Rnv. 1; Pfeffer, supra note 39.
57. He was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark,
Harlan, and Brennan. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. Mr.
Justice Stewart dissented. For discussion of these last two opinions, see notes
188-89 infra. Neither Mr. Justice Frankfurter nor Mr. Justice White par-
ticipated, the former being ill when the decision was announced and the
latter not yet having been appointed when the case was argued.
58. 370 U.S. at 424. The fact that the prayer recitation immediately
followed the salute to the flag was not even considered as changing the
characterization of the nature of the activity. Record, p. 13, Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. at 421. In this connection, see Schempp v. School Dist.,
177 F. Supp. 398, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1959). However, the Court's opinion later
pointed out that this was an "unquestioned religious exercise" (emphasis
added) and distinguished this case from "patriotic or ceremonial occasions"
such as "singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's
professions of faith in a Supreme Being." 370 U.S. at 435, n.21. Although
it appears that this refers only to "'The Star-Spangled Banner," the third
stanza of which contains references to the Deity, it seems that the Court
may be willing to single out those parts of a daily school exercise that are
of a religious nature yet unwilling to sever those verses of a song that are
solely religious. See text accompanying notes 541-44 infra.
59. This was acknowledged in The Regents Statement on Moral and
Spiritual Training in the Schools, Record, pp. 28-29, Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
60.
The petitioners contend . . . that the . . . prayer must be struck
down as a violation of the Establishment Clause because that prayer
was composed by government officials as a part of a governmental
program to further religious beliefs.... We agree with that contention
since we think that the [establishment clause] must at least mean that
in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as
a part of a religious program carried on by government.
370 U.S. at 425.
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Even if the Court's holding is this limited, it does not augur
well for the closely related public school practices of reading the
Bible and reciting other long-established prayers. 1 It can be ar-
gued that since the Bible and such prayers as the Lord's Prayer
were not composed by any governmental agency, they do not fall
into the same category as the Regents' prayer, 2 but there seems
to be no reason to distinguish between a governmental agency
composing a religious prayer for use in the schools and that same
agency selecting a prayer or other religious material composed
elsewhere.63 If anything, the Regents' prayer, which has been de-
scribed by some as "purely nondenominational," 4 would be much
less objectionable in our religiously pluralistic society than any
version of the Bible or the Lord's Prayer, none of which are un-
objectionable to all of the major religious faiths.65 Nor would the
circumstances be improved if, instead of the Regents selecting or
61. Pfeffer, Committee on Law and Social Action Reports, supra note
21, at 5-6, says that it follows from Engel that the Lord's Prayer and
Bible reading are likewise unconstitutional.
62. See Lewis, School-Prayer Issue in High Court Again, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1962, § 4, p. 5, col. 2.
63. It is difficult to believe that the decision in Engel would have been
different if, instead of the Regents having composed the words of this
prayer, they had selected them from a collection of prayers composed by
someone else. The opinion laid great emphasis on the bitter controversy
in 16th and 17th century England over the governmentally approved Book
of Common Prayer. 370 U.S. at 425-27, 429-30. The source of that strug-
gle was the question of what the content of the Book of Common Prayer
should be. Surely, it made no difference in that controversy whether the
government composed prayers that reflected the sentiments of a particular
religion or selected prayers already composed of the same kind. See
Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25, 38
n.36 (1962).
There is language in the opinion to support the conclusion that this
distinction should not be drawn.
[Olne of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to
worship in his own way [lies] in the Government's placing its official
stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer. . . [Neither
the power nor the prestige of the . . . Government [shall] be used
to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people
can say....
[G]overnment ... is without power to prescribe by law any particular
form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on
any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. ...
[E]ach separate government in this county should stay out of the
business of writing or sanctioning official prayers....
370 U.S. at 429, 430, 435. See 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 203 n.20 (1962).
64. 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499 (1962). See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 430 (1962). But see text accompanying notes 66-74 infra.
65. See text accompanying notes 258-81, 230-36 infra.
RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS
composing the prayer, either the teacher or the students made the
choice. Indeed, since these people would be much further re-
moved from the pressures of the political process than the Regents,
the product of such selection or composition would much more
likely be oriented toward the teachings of a particular religious
sect.66
Certain other observations may be made from an examination
of the Court's opinion. The question of whether the prayer was
denominationally neutra6 7 was sidestepped by the Court.' The
answer is manifest. Since it involved a supplication to God, it
patently favored the theistic religions over those that are nonthe-
istic, such as Ethical Culture (the religion of one of the complain-
ing parents).9 The conceded "purpose and effect"70 of this pro-
gram was "teaching our children . . . that Almighty God is their
Creator, and that by Him they have been endowed with their in-
alienable rights . . ".., Opposition was expressed even among
those religions teaching belief in a Supreme Being; some complain-
ed that the prayer was ineffectual, while others found it plainly
contrary to their religious beliefs.7" Furthermore, theistic religions
differ on the propriety of offering prayers not specifically decreed
by the sect and of seeking divine assistance in certain matters.7
66. Cf. Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 699, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 495
(1959).
67. Judge Froessel in the New York Court of Appeals found it to be
so. Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 176 N.E.2d 579, 583 (1961)
(concurring opinion).
68. 370 U.S. at 430.
69. Other nontheistic religions in this country are Buddhism, Taoism,
and Secular Humanism. See authorities cited in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
70. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443, 445, 449 (1961). See
also id. at 453.
71. The Regents Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the
Schools, Record, p. 28, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
72. Although the Catholic Church and most Protestant groups warmly
endorsed the prayer,
The Christian Century deemed [it] 'likely to deteriorate quickly into an
empty formality with little, if any, spiritual significance.' The leaders
of the Lutheran Church of Our Redeemer in Peekskill [N.Y.] charged
that Christ's name had 'deliberately been omitted to mollify non-
Christian elements,' and that the prayer 'therefore is a denial of
Christ and His prescription for a proper prayer. As such it is not
a prayer but an abomination and a blasphemy.'
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 396 (1953). Opposition was
also expressed by the Schenectady (N.Y.) Methodist Church Board, the
Liberal Ministers Club (primarily Unitarians and Universalists), and
"every important interested Jewish organization in the state." Ibid.
73. See the authorities cited in Brief for American Jewish Committee
and Anti-Defamation Leaue of B'nai B'rith as Amici Curiae, p. 20 n.6,
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See also Brief for Synagogue
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Thus, the Court could have easily reached its result by use of the
generally noncontroversial proposition that the establishment
clause forbids governmental preference of some religions over
others.7 4 However, since the Court had based a decision just one
year before on the thesis that a state cannot "constitutional-
ly pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against nonbelievers,"7 it would be hypercritical to say that, on
this ground, the Engel holding is too broad.
The holding may be criticized as too broad on another ground,
however. A major defense for the constitutionality of the Regents'
prayer was the fact that participation in its recitation was wholly
voluntary;16 objecting students were privileged either to remain
silent or to be excused from the room.7" The Court's opinion found
"the fact that its observance on the part of the students is volun-
tary" to be irrelevant."8 Although recognizing that "when the pow-
er, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind
a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon re-
ligious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain," 9 Mr. Justice Black stated that "the Establish-
ment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violat-
ed by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individ-
uals or not."8 The essence of this position seems to have emanat-
ed from the argument by two amici curiae in the case--one find-
ing an establishment clause violation, irrespective of the privilege
of nonparticipation, anytime government is engaged in "under-
taking or sponsoring religious programs";s' the other, whenever
there is state "participation in religious affairs." 2 This seemingly
Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council
as Amici Curiae, p. 10, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
74. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
75. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). See also authorities
cited in note 11 supra.
76. Brief for Respondents, pp. 32-34; Brief for Intervenors-Respondents,
pp. 11, 42-43; Brief for The Board of Regents of the University of the
State of New York as Amicus Curiae, p. 24, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
77. 370 U.S. at 430.
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 431.
80. Id. at 430. (Emphasis added.)
81. Brief for American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith as Amici Curiae, p. 17, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
82. Brief for Synagogue Council of America and National Community
Relations Advisory Council as Amici Curiae, p. 15 (Mr. Leo Pfeffer, At-
torney), Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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broad interpretation of the establishment clause was not necessary
to the decision in Engel. 3 The case could have been more dis-
cretely decided specifically on the ground that, regardless of the
dissenting student's right of nonparticipation, compulsion did ex-
ist;' that a showing of actual compulsion was unnecessary be-
cause of the "indirect coercive pressure" that this program exerted;
that the program would result either in the young children'
of the minority groups involved taking part in a religious ex-
ercise that was contrary to their conscientious beliefs or in their
being singled out as "oddballs" by their peers; that this is a cruel
choice that no state may constitutionally demand if it engages in a
solely religious activity. 6
II. SUPPORT FOR THE STANDARD
A. INDnRCT COERCION
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that in-
direct coercive pressure constitutes a violation of the establishment
clause,"7 there is a plethora of material to support this rationale.
1. Existence of Indirect Coercion
It is universally recognized that such pressures in fact exist.
Many writers of widely diverse backgrounds' have observed that
young people of minority religious groups are extremely sensitive
about conspicuously absenting themselves from religious exer-
cises conducted by the majority and that there is a powerful,
albeit subtle, pressure to conform. The emotional strain is very
frequently so great that it results in unwilling participation in pref-
erence to some amount of social ostracism. Student commentators
83. See text accompanying notes 189-92 infra.
84. But see Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HAIv.
L. REv. 25, 39 (1962).
85. The parents bringing this suit had a total of ten children attending
school. The ages of the children ranged from seven to 15. Record, pp. 11-
12, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
86. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart
J., dissenting).
87. This is pointed out in 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 500 n.25 (1962).
88. These include Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools,
40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 495 (1955) (professor of government); Levy,
Views from the Wall - Reflections on Church-State Relationships, 29
HENNEPiN LAW. 51, 55 (1961) (professor of law); Harpster, Religion,
Education and the Law, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 24, 42 (1952), and Vishny, The
Constitution and Religion in the Public Schools, Decalogue J., June-July
1960, pp. 4, 5-6; (practicing attorneys); Lewis, School-Prayer Issue in High
Court Again, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1962, § E, p. 5, col. I (newspaper
columnist).
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have made the same judgment.8 9 A recent opinion by the Attorn-
ey General of California stated that "children forced by conscience
to leave the room during such exercises would be placed in a po-
sition inferior to that of students adhering to the State-endorsed
religion. '"90
Social psychologists and sociologists have pointed out that chil-
dren place great importance on how they are esteemed by their
classmates.9 The urge to conform to their classmates' attitudes is
peculiarly strong,92 and "the fear of being accused by the others
of wanting to be 'different' " and the "very strong need to remain
a member of one's group"93 are carried so far as to cause these
children to do and say things in accordance with the majority that
they are convinced are wrong, even with reference to simple per-
ceptual materials. 94 This is particularly prevalent "where the situa-
tion is ambiguous and not very clear-cut."95 The option either to
participate in the majority's religious worship or "to suffer the pain
of psychic loneliness"96 has been recently described by Dr. Rob-
ert Bierstedt as forcing these immature students "to choose be-
tween equally intolerable alternatives. 9 7 Even religious educators
have warned "that so-called voluntary exemption [from religious
observances] does not overcome the compulsion exerted by ma-
jority behavior."98
The insight is not new. As long ago as 1890, state appellate
court judges recognized the fact that a nonparticipant in a reli-
89. E.g., 11 AM. U.L. REV. 91 (1962); 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 146(1961).
90 25 CAL. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 316, 319 (1955).
91. BOSSARD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 462 (1948).92. MURPHY & MURPHY, EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 511-16(1931). See also Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools,
supra note 88, at 495: "A number of psychologists, backed by parents ...point out the tremendous strength of the pressure to conform."93. BERENDA, THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP ON THE JUDGMENTS OF
CHILDREN 30 (1950).
94. Id. at 16-33.
95. Id. at 32.
96. Address by Professor Robert Bierstedt, The Use of Public Schoolsfor Religious Purposes, ACLU Biennial Conference, June 22, 1962, p. 10.
Dr. Bierstedt is Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology
at the New York University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
97. Ibid.
98. Committee on Religion and Public Education of the National Council
of the Churches of Christ, Relation of Religion to Public Education-A
Study Document, INTERNATIONAL J. OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, April 1960,pp. 21, 29. See also Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 23, 39 (1949): "Thousand of educators of all religious convictions
are increasingly agreed that the atmosphere of public schools is not free
from pressures."
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gious exercise "loses caste with his fellows." 9 Lower federal court
judges have also made this observation.' Four Justices of the
Supreme Court subscribed to this theory when they stated: "That
a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters
sacred to conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of
imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an outstanding
characteristic of children."''
The fact that these public school religious practices are inher-
ently compulsive may be empirically demonstrated by examining
actual situations in some of the litigated cases. Terry McCollum,
whose mother, an ardent atheist, successfully challenged a pro-
gram of released time religious classes on public school premises
in Champaign, Illinois,0 - exercised his right of nonparticipa-
tion during the first semester of his fourth grade, but the next
semester he did attend religious classes. The following year, he
changed schools. In the first semester of his fifth grade, he and
only one other pupil declined to attend religious classes; during
the second semester, the other boy capitulated."0 In Terry's
school, "children of some thirty-one sects, including Catholic, Jew-
ish, and Protestant, as well as many children without any particu-
lar religious preference,' ' 0 4 voluntarily attended a course teaching
the tenets of Protestantism. Donna Schempp's father, a member of
the Unitarian faith, challenged Bible reading in the Abington Town-
ship, Pennsylvania, public schools as contrary to his family's re-
99. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 200, 44 N.W. 967,
975 (1890). In North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Il1. 296, 304, 27 N.E. 54,
56 (1891), the court observed that it was well-known that public schools
conduct religious exercises "and that, with rare exceptions, those attending
them yield cheerful obedience thereto, regardless of their personal views
on the subject of religion." See also Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga.
762, 786, 110 S.E. 895, 906 (1922) (dissenting opinion); People ex rel.
Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 IM. 334, 351, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910);
Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 699-700, 166 N.W. 202, 205 (19-
18); Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 1050, 68 So.
116, 121 (1915); Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 155-
56, 214 N.W. 18, 23 (1927) (dissenting opinion); Engel v. Vitale, 10
N.Y.2d 174, 190, 176 N.E.2d 579, 587 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
100. Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
101. Opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in which Justices Jackson,
Rutledge, and Burton joined, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
102. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
103. See People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 396 111. 14, 17, 71
N.E.2d 161, 162 (1947).
104. Record, p. 65, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948).
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ligious beliefs." 5 Donna had never voiced her objections to
school authorities and, on occasion, even volunteered to read the
Bible herself.'016 In Southern elementary schools, there are es-
tablished periods of Christian Bible study; Jewish children have
the option of leaving the room, but "some believe that it is better
to remain seated than to have forty-three children watch one or
.two others shuffle out.' '0 7
2. The Defenses of Indirect Coercion
Although there are a few instances of disagreement with the
proposition that subtle coercion inheres in these situations,10 8
most writers and state judges,0 9 unwilling to find a constitution-
al violation, argue that "these pressures to conform are part of the
normal social pattern and part of the price of being a religious
nonconformist is the social stigma which all nonconformists have
to bear""'  and that it "is perhaps not a major hardship and is
a sacrifice which a minority might well make to a majority.""'
Some argue that "if the State is going to undertake to protect the
child at one point, there seems to be no logical reason for its
stopping there-it should protect the child from such mental and
105. Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
106. Id. at 400. "Indeed the lack of protest may itself attest to the
success and the subtlety of the compulsion." Id. at 407.
107. Harry L. Golden, quoted in PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREE-
DOM 304 (1953). "The Christian children wonder why one or two of their
number 'do not want to hear about God,' and the Jewish child is also
heartsick as well as bewildered." Ibid.
108. People ex rel. Vo~lmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 293, 255 Pac.
610, 618 (1927): "The shoe is on the other foot. We have known many
boys to be ridiculed for complying with religious regulations, but never
one for neglecting them or absenting himself from them." For a singularly
acrid and sarcastic (although neither very confident nor persuasive) re-jection of the fact, see Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Public Instruc-
tion, 143 So. 2d 21, 31-33 (Fla. 1962). The suggestion has been made that
non-believing children may simply remain silent when religious invocations
are being delivered by all of the others and thereby avoid the appearance
of "non-conformity." Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc. 2d 68, 74, 159 N.Y.S.2d
807, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 499-500 (1962).
Such advice is extremely naive; remaining silent conspicuously indicates
the nonparticipant's status.
109. See Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, -, 179 A.2d 698, 704(1962); Engel v. Vitale, 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 349, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183,
191-92 (1960) (separate opinion); Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 695-
96, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 491-92 (1959).
110. Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL L.Q.
475, 495 (1955).
111. Sutherland, Public Authority and Religious Education: A Brief
Survey of Constitutional and Legal Limits, in THE STUDY OF RELIGION
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 33, 51 (Brown ed. 1958). See also
Note, 49 COLuM. L. REV. 836, 843-44 (1949).
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emotional abuse in all circumstances. But this is totally impossi-
ble."'" 2 The progenitor of this reasoning is the dictum of Mr.
Justice Jackson that "it may be doubted whether the Constitu-
tion which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be con-
strued also to protect one from the embarrassment that always at-
tends nonconformity, whether in religion, politics, behavior or
dress."" 3
One need not quarrel with the unfortunate truism that it is
probably inherent in our society that aberrant religionists and non-
believers will be subjected to some scorn and derision. Because
of this, societal pressures will be brought to bear on religious non-
conformists to forsake their beliefs. As long as these societal
pressures are initiated by "private action," the Constitution affords
no self-executing relief. But when the state or federal government
adopts a solely religious program-whose only immediate effect
is the promotion of religion and in which benefit to religion is a
condition precedent to any possible public benefit-it has ap-
proached the brink of its constitutional power. Some would seem
to contend that such governmental activity of itself crosses the
first amendment's boundary of church-state separation." How-
ever, the proposed standard only requires that when this govern-
mental activity unavoidably results in pressures on the immature
to abandon their conscientious scruples, or in the influencing of
free religious choice, the establishment clause should be deemed
violated. It should not be the function of a governmental program
to increase "the-price of being a religious nonconformist ' ' when
112. Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law, 36 MARQ. L REv. 24,
48 (1952).
113. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 233
(1948) (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Jackson spoke only for himself.
It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Justice Jackson's subscription
to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's McCollum opinion that takes the opposite
stand. See text accompanying note 101 supra. See also the statement by
Mr. Justice Reed that "one can hardly speak of that embarrassment as a
prohibition against the free exercise of religion." 333 U.S. at 241. For dis-
cussion-of the free exercise issue see note 126 infra.
It should be made clear that it is not merely "embarrassment" that
result in the situations under discussion. To define the problem with that
term "tends. to assume that a child, of tender years has the necessary
courage of his convictions-or perhaps more accurately in this situation,
the courage of his parents' convictions-to withstand with emotional im-
punity some very real pressures to conform to group standards and to avoid
being- marked by his fellows as an 'outsider.' " 11 AM. U.L. REv. 93
(1962).
114. See text-accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
115. Cushman, supra note 110, at 495. Cf. Kamisar, Betts v. Brady
Twenty Years Later: The Right-to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61
MIcH. L. REV. 219, 246 (1962), who argues that because an indigent'crim-
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the only immediate results of the program, if any results are
forthcoming at all, are aids to religion. Majority will should not
be permitted to impose minority sacrifices when that will is ex-
pressed through solely religious governmental action in an area af-
forded specific protection by the first amendment. Neither un-
orthodox behavior nor dress fits that category; logical distinc-
tions may be drawn. The contrary position amounts to "no less
than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty
of small minorities to the popular will.""' 6
It is not being suggested that, in vacuo, the state is obligated
to undertake to protect children of religious minorities, or chil-
dren of the religious majority who have marginal convictions, from
the embarrassment and concomitant pressures that nonconformity
brings. The Constitution does not demand that the result of every
state activity be free from such effects. Solely religious programs
should not be confused, as they have been," 7 with those in-
stances in which the state's program has the accomplishment of
a secular purpose as its immediate goal.
The Flag Salute Case.. illustrates this distinction. The Su-
preme Court held that a state could not compel the pledge of al-
legiance and salute to the flag by public school children who ob-
jected because of religious conviction. The result was that object-
ing children were excused from participation. Since the daily pro-
gram of saluting the flag continued, there is no doubt that those
who conscientiously objected were faced with precisely the same
type dilemma as the children whose beliefs precluded participation
inal defendant suffers many handicaps that courts are powerless to elimi-
nate is hardly an excuse for enlarging them or perpetuating others.
116. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
117. See Brief for Intervenors-Respondents, pp. 45-47, 51, Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National
School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 8 n.25 (1949). But cf. Brief
for Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Ad-
visory Council as Amici Curiae, pp. 16-19, Engel v. Vitale, supra.
118. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Complainants in the case were Jehovah's Witnesses. Their religious beliefs
included a literal version of Exodus, 20: 4-5, which says, "Thou shalt
not make unto thee any graven image . . .: Thou shalt not bow down thy-
self to them, nor serve them." They considered the flag as an "image"
within this command.
Although the Court stated that the case did not "turn on one's posses-
sion of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held,"
319 U.S. at 634, and found that the state was generally without power to
compel anyone to salute the flag, id. at 642, the case has been often con-
sidered, because of its facts, as presenting a free exercise of religion issue.
See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
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in the recitation of the Regents' prayer. School children whose
religious scruples forbid them from taking part in military train-
ing 9 or from attending classes in physical education, ' social
dancing,"2  or hygiene, 12 2 suffer similar difficulties. However,
since the requirement of pledging allegiance to the flag is imposed
to promote patriotism,' and since military training and physi-
cal education, dancing, and hygiene classes are placed in the public
school curriculum to further national and educational goals, these
activities of the state must be fairly characterized as secular. In
no way do they promote religion, nor do they rely on religious
inculcation for their attainment. Such activities, on their face,
are unquestionably within the scope of state power. Some chil-
dren's religious objections to participating in these secular activities
may entitle them to be excused on the ground of protecting the
free exercise of their religion,"2 but since the state's program is
secular, dissenters cannot require the state to abandon it altogeth-
er because its continued operation inherently coerces them to
join. This is the price the deviator must pay. To hold otherwise
would indeed be minority oppression of the majority. It is only
when the state engages in a solely religious activity that it should
bear the full responsibility for the infringements on freedom of
religious choice that such a program brings about. ss It is un-
119. Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
120. Cf. IOWA CODE § 280.14 (1962).
121. Cf. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 205
Pac. 49 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
122. Cf. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-7-12 (Supp. 1958); 1 FLA.
STAT. § 231.09 (1) (1959); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204 (5); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 14-1419 (1962).
123. See 11 AM. U.L. REv. 91, 93 (1962).
124. The question of whether and when the free exercise clause is
violated by the compelling of participation in secular activities irrespective
of the fact that such participation is forbidden by one's religion is beyond
the scope of this article. The issue is one that the Supreme Court appears
not yet to have resolved. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605
(1961).
125. Professor Kauper rejects this analysis. He agrees that it would
be unconstitutional if actual pressure were exerted on any student to
take part in the solely religious activity of released time. See text ac-
companying notes 467-72 infra.
But a proper sense of concern for the non-participant does not re-
quire rejection of the program on constitutional grounds. A Jehovah's
Witness child may not be required to take part in a public school flag
salute exercise. He is permitted to abstain. But the public school is
not required in deference to his religious convictions to abandon the
flag salute exercise even though it carries religious, connotations for
persons in this category and may, therefore, in this sense be charac-
terized as a religious exercise. Similarily it should be possible to retain
a released time program ... while doing justice to the non-participants.
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necessary to determine whether such infringements result in a vio-
lation of the free exercise clause."2 6 If the activity is both sole-
ly religious and inherently compulsive, it should be found to be
a violation of the establishment clause.
B. SUPPORT FROM THE SUPREME COURT
1. The McCollum Case
As already mentioned, there is no Supreme Court decision that
articulates this rationale as its basis. However, examination of the
McCollum case 27 lends strong support. In that case, the board
of education permitted teachers employed by private religious
groups to hold weekly religious classes in the public school build-
ings during regular school hours. 23 The classes were attended by
those students whose parents signed cards requesting their permis-
sion, and nonparticipants were required to continue their public
school studies in other classrooms. The parent of a nonpartici-
pant challenged this program under the establishment clause and
was sustained by the Supreme Court.
Some writers have interpreted McCollum to stand for the prop-
osition that any use of public property for religious purposes is
forbidden.'29 The Court's subsequent decision in the New York
Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 MICH. L. REV. 829,
842 (1954). (Footnotes omitted.)
The difficulty with this approach is the characterization of the flag salute
as a "religious exercise," thus putting it in the same category as the
Regents' prayer. The two activities are intrinsically different. One furthers
religion if it does anything; the other in no way advances any religious
cause. To say that any governmental activity that offends some religion is
a "religious exercise" would mean that a declaration of war could be
so characterized. Cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S.
245 (1934).
126. It may well be argued that even though these indirect pressures,
which accrue when the privilege of nonparticipation is granted, do not
result in a breach of the free exercise clause when the state's activity is
secular, free exercise is violated when the state action is solely religious.
This would certainly be true if the outcome of free exercise problems
"depends upon the balancing of the secular needs of the community
against the religious rights of the individual . . . ." Brief for Synagogue
Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council
as Amici Curiae, p. 17, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
127. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
128. Originally, classes had been conducted by Protestant teachers,
Catholic priests, and a Jewish rabbi. During the final few years, the Jewish
classes had been discontinued. The classes were held for 30 minutes in
the lower grades and for 45 minutes in the upper grades. Id. at 207-09.
129. E.g., Cosway & Toepfer, Religion and the Schools, 17 U. CINC.
L. REV. 117, 132-33 (1948); Cushman, Public Support of Religious Edu-
cation in American Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REV. 333, 352 (1950);
25 ALBANY L. REV. 318, 319 (1961).
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Released Time Case13 furnishes credence to this analysis. If this
reading is accurate, the Court's decision in Engel was predeter-
mined by McCollum irrespective of the question of inherent com-
pulsion since the Regents' prayer was concededly a religious exer-
cise being conducted on school property. In fact, the Regents'
prayer arguably made greater use of public "property" than the
released time program since, in the former case, the teachers con-
ducting the religious exercise were publicly employed."" But such
a reading of McCollum must be rejected. In the Engel opinion,
McCollum was not even cited. Although the Court at several
points in its McCollum opinion did refer to the fact that tax-sup-
ported property was being used for the dissemination of religious
doctrines, 32 each time it did so it was careful to couple this
fact with a reference to the fact that the public school machinery
was being used to foster attendance at religious classes.1ss Further-
more, on several occasions the Court has held that the equal
protection clause forbids discriminatory treatment in permitting the
use of public parks by religious organizations for religious pur-
poses,' 3 ' thus implying that such use of public property is not
constitutionally barred.135 Indeed, at least one commentator has
argued that to deny religious organizations the use of public prop-
erty while permitting its use by other agencies in the community
would itself violate the religion clauses of the first amendment.'
Even when religious organizations have made the only nonpub-
lic use of public property (which appears to have been the case
in McCollum), such use has been sustained by state courts when
it did not result in any measurable cost to the taxpayers.13 " In
130. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
131. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 24-25, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Brief for American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith as Amici Curiae, p. 13, Engel v. Vitale, supra.
But see note 146 infra for evidence of the more extensive use of the
public school building in McCollum.
132. 333 U.S. at 209, 212.
133. The author of the McCollum opinion, Mr. Justice Black, made
clear that it was at least his intention that the "decision would have been
the same if the religious classes had not been held in the school buildings."
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 316 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
134. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
135. See Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 829, 836 (1954); Sullivan, Religious Education in the Schools, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 92, 108-09 (1949); Note, 57 YALEL . 1114,
1117-18 (1948).
136. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1, 60 (1961).
137. Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.
2d 697 (Fla. 1959) (temporary use of public school buildings by several
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his excellent book, Leo Pfeffer contends that the principle of de
minimis non curat lex" s has no application when either the estab-
lishment clause or the free exercise clause is concerned; "the right
sought to be vindicated is a religious right, not an economic one,
and it is therefore inappropriate to measure it in economic
terms." '139 The Supreme Court, some time ago, indicated its re-
jection of the de mininis maxim in regard to first amendment
freedoms. 40 But when governmental activity, even that fairly
characterized as "solely religious," does not infringe on religious
liberty, either by violating the free exercise clause or by compro-
mising or influencing the freedom of conscientious choice in a
manner that arguably does not violate the free exercise clause,'
the financial expenditure involved must be subject to measurement
by the de minimis standard. Otherwise, the appearance of "In God
We Trust" on our coins would be unconstitutional. Even Pfeffer
has found this to be "insignificant almost to the point of being
trivial,"'42 thus impliedly invoking the de minimis principle.
Examination of his analysis reveals that Pfeffer was concerned
solely with those religious programs by government that tend to
compromise one's religious beliefs. Likewise, the Supreme Court
dictum was concerned with the protection of liberty. Other recog-
nized authorities have suggested that there must be a place for the
de minimis doctrine in this area.' 4' State courts have specifically
accepted its existence,' and the Engel case need not be read to
churches for Sunday religious meetings); Nichols v. School Directors,
93 I11. 61, 34 Am. Rep. 160 (1879) (occasional use of school houses by
different church organizations for religious services); State ex rel. Gilbert
v. Dilley, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N.W. 999 (1914) (occasional use of school
building for Sunday school and religious meetings). But see Hysong v.
Gallitzin Borough School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30 Atl. 482 (1894) (use of
public school rooms immediately after regular school hours for Catholic
religious instruction to those students of the school who were Catholic by
Catholic sisters who were also public school teachers).
It might be suggested that in this final case, unlike the other three, the
facts created an atmosphere that resulted in pressures on both Catholic
and non-Catholic children to attend the religious classes. See note 461 itnlra.
138. The law does not concern itself with trifles.
139. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 168 (1953).
140. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (1945). More recently,
the Court appears to have retreated from this position. See, e.g., Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72, 77-78 (1959).
141. See text accompanying notes 125-26 supra.
142. Pfeffer, Church and State: Something Less Than Separation, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23 (1951).
143. Kauper, supra note 135, at 837; Sutherland, Due Process and
Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1343 (1949).
144. Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.
2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1959); People ex reL Lewis v. Graves, 219 App. Div.
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have rejected it since it may be explained on grounds of inherent
compulsion.'45 Therefore, since the operation of the released time
program in McCollum involved "no direct appropriation of any
kind or direct expenditures of money of any kind,'11,6 the use
of public property there must be considered de minimis, and the
Supreme Court's decision cannot be explained on the basis of
financial aid to religion.4 7
The McCollum decision can only be accounted for on the
ground that the operation of the released time program-a pro-
gram having no independent primary secular goal-resulted in com-
promising the conscientious beliefs of the complainant's child.'"8
This inherent effect of released time must have been the "invaluable
aid' 9 that the Court found the state was affording "sectarian
groups . . . in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious
233, 236, 219 N.Y. Supp. 189, 192 (1927); Nichols v. School Directors,
93 IM. 61, 63, 34 Am. Rep. 160, 162 (1879). In the first case, the court
stated that the state constitution would be violated "if the use of the
school buildings [for Sunday religious meetings] were permitted for pro-
longed periods of time, absent evidence of an immediate intention on the
part of the Church to construct its own buildings ... " 115 So. 2d at
700.
145. But see Pfeffer, The New York Regents' Prayer Case (Engel v.
Vitale): Its Background, Meaning and Implications, Committee on Law
and Social Action Reports 6 (American Jewish Congress, June 26, 1962).
146. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 396 I11. 14, 24, 71
N.E.2d 161, 166 (1947). The court pointed out that
the classes were held in the schoolrooms during the current school
period and the rooms were in use during the entire period, and, no
doubt, the same cost for lights, heat, janitor service, etc. would exist
whether or not the schoolroom was used at the particular time by this
particular class. Any additional wear and tear on the floors would
seem to be inconsequential. . . . Any additional wear and tear of
furniture due to the religious education classes.., would be negligible.
Ibid. See also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 234 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
147. As this author has suggested elsewhere, the use of the de minimis
principle in this field may call not only for a measurement of the finan-
cial expenditure by government, but also for an examination of the
financial benefit to religion. LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, SUPPLE-
MENT TO DODD'S CASES ON CONsTrrurIoNAL LAW 358 (1962). Although
the former may be negligible, the latter may be quite substantial. See 35
ILL. B.J. 361, 363 (1947). However, this aspect of the problem was not
considered at any stage of the McColum litigation. See note 146 supra.
The Court did find that the released time program afforded unconstitution-
al aid to religion, but it was not the financial benefit received that turned
the decision. See text accompanying notes 148-53 infra. Cf. Cushman,
supra note 129, at 352.
148. See Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury,
Signifying .. .," 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 1, 29-30. For a complete
discussion of how and why this is the result of the program's operation,
see text accompanying notes 376-87 infra.
149. 333 U.S. at 212.
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classes through the use of the State's compulsory public school
machinery."' 0 The Court did state that it was unnecessary to
consider the contention that the program "was voluntary in name
only because in fact subtle pressures were brought to bear on the
students to force them to participate in it."'' This declaration
may be explained as a response to appellant's argument that the
factual evidence in the case belied the trial court's finding that
Terry McCollum's teachers and classmates did nothing to subject
him to embarrassment because of his religious opinions.152 The
Court's statement should not be read as rejecting the contention
that the released time program was in some way inherently coer-
cive and therefore constitutionally defective. Indeed, other writers
have found some form of inherent coercion to be the basis upon
which the decision was predicated.'5 '
Furthermore, it would seem that the only justification for the
Court's finding that appellant had standing to maintain the action
was the fact that Terry was subject to certain subtle pressures in-
herent in the released time program.'" The existing rule is well
settled that a "party who invokes the power [of the federal courts
to restrain unconstitutional acts] must be able to show not only
that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediate-
150. Ibid. Further evidence that the Court relied on the inherent
pressures of the activity:
The operation of the State's compulsory education system thus assists
and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on
by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school
for secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon
the condition that they attend the religious classes.
Id. at 209-10.
151. Id. at 207 n.1. (Emphasis added.)
152. The trial court's finding may be found in Record, p. 68, Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Brief for
Appellant, pp. 26-30, advanced the testimony of a number of witnesses
that was contrary to this finding and explained how the testimony relied
upon by the trial judge was inadequate. Although counsel for appellant
interwove this contention with the "inherent compulsion" argument, the
Court's statement was addressed only to those of appellant's arguments
that took "issue with the facts found by the Illinois courts .... " 333
U.S. at 207.
153. E.g., Sutherland, Public Authority and Religious Education: A
Brief Survey of Constitutional and Legal Limits, in THE STUDY OF
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 49 (Brown ed. 1958);
16 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 558-59 (1948).
154. The Court perfunctorily rejected the contention that appellant had
no standing. 333 U.S. at 206. Mr. Justice Black, the author of the Court's
opinion, has indicated on other occasions that his standard on the question
of standing in the church-state area is considerably more lenient than is
the prevailing rule. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 n.6(1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. MeGinley, 366
U.S. 582, 592 n.10 (1961).
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ly in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way
in common with people generally." '55 The interest of appellant,
Terry's mother, was asserted as that of a resident, taxpayer, and
parent of a child then enrolled in a public school having a re-
leased time program. 56 The record made clear that appellant was
an atheist who desired that her child not be indoctrinated with
any religious teachings."5 ' Although the Court permitted a local
taxpayer to challenge local governmental action as being in viola-
tion of the establishment clause in Everson,'s that case involved
"a measurable appropriation or disbursement of school-district
funds."'5 9 Since the released time program in McCollum, like
Bible reading in the public schools, 60 did not involve a sub-
stantial disbursement, appellant had no standing as a taxpayer. If
appellant had sought standing solely on the basis of the fact that
she was a parent of an attending child, she would have failed
because there could have been absolutely no showing of any di-
rect injury. It could have been accurately said that there was "no
assertion that [he] was injured or even offended thereby or that
[he] was compelled to accept, approve, or confess agreement
with any dogma or creed or even [attend released time religious
classes]."'' Nor, under existing doctrine,' 1  could standing
have been conferred on appellant on the ground that those who
were injured were unable to assert their rights effectively.'3 Ap-
pellant satisfied the existing standing prerequisites by alleging the
infringement of a constitutionally protected right-the right of her
child to be free from certain inherent pressures to participate in a
solely religious governmental activity irrespective of any direct
coercion. Only by finding the recognition of such a right in Mc-
Collum may those who questioned appellant's standing be an-
swered'" and may the decision be satisfactorily explained.'
155. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
156. 333 U.S. at 205.
157. Record, pp. 1-2, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
158. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See text ac-
companying notes 28-29 supra.
159. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
160. Cf. id. at 429.
161. Id. at 432 (dictum).
162. See text accompanying notes 219-27 infra.
163. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60(1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
164. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 232-
33 (1948) (Jackson, J.); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School
Board, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 5-9 (1949); Kauper, supra note
135, at 834-35.
165. See generally Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel,
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2. Other Doctrines
There is other support to be found in the decisions of the Sup-
reme Court for the proposed constitutional standard. The Court
has unanimously held that, unless justified by some valid over-
riding interest, a state cannot compel individuals to disclose their
membership in an association if such identification, although not
directly suppressing the right of free speech protected by the first
amendment, nevertheless would have this consequence.' 0 It
can hardly be said that the state's engaging in a solely religious
activity manifests an overriding public interest; 117 in fact, such
state activity has been attacked as being in itself invalid.,,
When the state embarks on such a program and then grants the
privilege of nonparticipation to conscientious dissenters to avoid
problems under the free exercise clause,'69 disclosure of member-
ship in a religious (or nonreligious) group results. Such identifica-
tion, in turn, tends to compromise religious beliefs 70 that fall
within the broad ambit of the first amendment's protection.17'
This effect is generally unquestioned. 72 The fact that this "re-
76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 31-35 (1962). Cf. Kurland, supra note 148, at
29-30.
166. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
167. See text preceding note 114 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
169. It is undisputed that the free exercise clause, if not also the
establishment clause, would be violated if participation in these solely
religious activities were governmentally compelled. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 430-31 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1952);
Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc. 2d 68, 72-73, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct.
1957); Kauper, Released Time and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply,
53 MICH. L. REV. 233, 234 (1954); 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 336, 341 (1948).
170. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (19-
58): "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstanc-
es be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs."
171. There is persuasive authority for the proposition that it would be
unconstitutional for the Government itself to cause a religious nonconformist
to be embarrassed, harassed, or humiliated so as to coerce him to com-
promise his conscientious beliefs. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (concurring opinion); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
172. See text accompanying notes 87-101 supra. Cf. NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel.Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958):
Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed
these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under
these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of
petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability
of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster
beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may
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pressive effect... follows not from state action but from private
community pressures"'7 3 is irrelevant; 74 "the crucial factor is
the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only
after the initial exertion of state power represented by the [in-
troduction of solely religious programs] . . . that private action
takes hold."' 75
It is true that all of those Supreme Court decisions in the church-
state area that have relied on a compulsion theory to find govern-
mental action to be forbidden by the first amendment have involv-
ed instances of compulsion directly imposed by government 70
However, the Court has shown no inclination to give any weight
to differing degrees of governmental compulsion so long as it seems
that the state action is likely to compromise conscientious beliefs
or influence the freedom of religious choice. Thus, a state require-
ment that people who wish to become notaries public must de-
clare their belief in God does not as forcefully compel the forsak-
ing or influencing of conscientious beliefs as would be the case if
the state prosecuted those who refused to declare their belief; T '
nor does the imposition of a license tax on religious colporteurs
compel them as strongly as would a penal provision. But since
"the loss of opportunity to obtain private employment . . . may
be sufficient to persuade at least some uncommitted persons to
adopt a religion,"'78 the Court did not hesitate in Torcaso v.
Watkins ' 79 to strike down the required notaries' declaration by a
unanimous vote; the license tax was held invalid in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania because it "tends to suppress" religious practices.-5 0
induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others
from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown
through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.
173. Id. at 463.
174.
In the domain of these indispensible liberties [under the first amend-
ment], the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgement of such
rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied
forms of governmental action. . . . The governmental action chal-
lenged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties.
Id. at 461.
175. Id. at 463. (Emphasis added.) This same analysis is implicit in
the decision holding an ordinance that forbade the distribution of anony-
mous handbills unconstitutional on the ground that it tended to restrict
freedoms protected by the first amendment. Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60 (1960). See generally Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the
Public Schools, 22 U. PrIT. L. REV. 561, 582-84 (1961).
176. See cases cited notes 177-80 infra.
177. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
178. 74 HARv. L. REv. 611, 614 (1961).
179. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
180. 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943).
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It would seem to be only a small step to hold, as state courts have
done, s' that when the state engages in a solely religious activity,
its action is constitutionally barred if it inherently produces social
compulsion to abandon religious convictions.
Before moving on, it should be noted that the constitutional
significance of coercion in the area of church-state problems has
not escaped attention. Thus, in evaluating several governmental
programs that must be fairly characterized as solely religious, Pro-
fessor Paul Kauper has relied on the absence of any sort of coer-
cion to sustain their constitutionality. 8 ' On the other hand, he
condemns the appropriation of public funds for church buildings
or ministers' salaries since "the maintenance of churches is itself
not a governmental function and since it coerces the conscience
of nonbelieving taxpayers."' 3 Professor Robert Levy has con-
cluded that "any program which operates to compel the young and
impressionable to orient to religion should be unconstitutional."'' 4
3. Application in Engel v. Vitale
Thus, the way had been well paved for the Supreme Court spe-
cifically to restrict its Regents' Prayer decision to the compulsive
effect on young children inherent in this solely religious activity
by the state. Such a definite limitation would have clearly immuniz-
181. E.g., Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So.
2d 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (distribution of Gideon Bibles in public
schools); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953) (dis-
tribution of Gideon Bibles in public schools).
182. In discussing the chaplains in both houses of Congress, Professor
Kauper states that "this is a plain case of spending federal money for
religious purposes." Kauper, supra note 135, at 837. This seems clearly
to indicate that he considers this a solely religious activity. He goes on to
state that "it can hardly be considered a substantial use of public funds
in aid of religion, and it is not seriously argued that anyone's conscience is
coerced by this practice." Ibid. The final point is clearly sound although
it would not be similarly valid if the chaplains gave daily prayer recita-
tions in the public schools. In raising the question of "substantial use of
public funds," Professor Kauper seems to present this as an independent
criterion for judging solely religious activities. If it is, as it may well be,
one might effectively argue that an annual expenditure of $17,620, see
75 Stat. 320, 324 (1961), is hardly de minimis, even when compared to
the entire federal budget. See also text accompanying note 147 supra.
As to released time programs, Professor Kauper concludes that it has
not been demonstrated that they deprive anyone of any liberty. Kauper,
supra note 135, at 236. An attempted refutation of the conclusion may be
found at notes 376-87 infra.
183. Id. at 846. Here, again, the point made seems to be that this is a
solely religious activity.
184. Levy, Views from the Wall-Reflections on Church-State Separa-
tion, 29 HENNEPIN LAW. 51, 55 (1961). Examination of the context of
this statement seems to indicate that Professor Levy was concerned only
with those public school "programs" that are solely religious.
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ed the Court from the position, taken in the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Douglas, that government cannot "constitutionally
finance a religious exercise . . . whatever form it takes."ss It
would also have effectively distinguished the Regents' prayer situa-
tion from most "of the religious traditions of our people, reflect-
ed in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our
government," ' 6 cited by Mr. Justice Stewart in his lone dissent.
However, although the language used by the Court appears to be
quite comprehensive,' it would be rash to conclude that Engel
passed judgment on (or even hinted at) the long list of govern-
mental activities disapproved by Mr. Justice Douglas"'e or brought
forward by Mr. Justice Stewart.8 9 The Court's statement that
185. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) (concurring opinion).
See note 188 infra.
186. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
See note 189 infra.
187. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
188. Among the governmental programs and activities that Mr. Justice
Douglas would seem to find unconstitutional are congressional and armed
service chaplains, use of the Bible for the administration of oaths, "In God
We Trust" on coins and currency, and opening prayers in legislative
chambers and courts-including the Supreme Court. None of these would
seem to produce the inherent pressures that arise from a solely religious
activity in the public schools and, thus, are subject to separate considera-
tion. Also included were activities having an independent primary secular
goal, such as the availability of funds for parochial schools, G.I. Bill pay-
ments to denominational schools, and National School Lunch Act benefits
to religious schools. In addition, Mr. Justice Douglas expressed his present
disagreement with his vote with the majority in Everson (see text accom-
panying notes 28-29 supra), a case raising problems very different from
those presented by the Regents' prayer. See text accompanying notes 21-49
supra. The evil ingredient that he found to be common to all of these
governmental activities was that they "insert a divisive influence into our
communities." 370 U.S. at 442, 443. For criticism of this standard, see
text accompanying notes 362-65 infra.
Mr. Justice Douglas found "no element of compulsion" in the case.
370 U.S. at 438. He stated that there was no more inherent coercion here
than there was in the prayers that open sessions of Congress and the Court.
Id. at 442. This seems to ignore the pertinence of the public school setting
and the maturity of the participants. See text accompanying notes 87-107
supra.
189. In addition to a number of the matters referred to by Mr. Justice
Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart listed such things as presidential inaugural
statements asking the protection and help of God and presidential procla-
mations of a National Day of Prayer. Neither of these produce effects
that are realistically comparable to the social pressures produced in the
public school atmosphere. Whether or not constitutional, they must be
considered apart from the Regents' prayer.
Mr. Justice Stewart decided that the case was "entirely free of any
compulsion .. . including any 'embarrassments and pressures,"' because
"the state courts have made clear that those who object to reciting the
prayer must be" free of these things. 370 U.S. at 445. (Emphasis added.)
But-no :mandate .of any court can free this solely religious activity from
its concomitant inherent pressures.
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"the Establishment Clause. .. does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion"' 90 is entirely consistent with
the rationale that the establishment clause is violated by certain
laws that produce inherent, albeit indirect and nongovernmental,
compulsion. So is the Court's pronouncement that the establish-
ment clause "is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not."'' Those "laws which estab-
lish an official religion" might well be interpreted to mean those
laws having no independent primary secular purpose or effect,
and the entire pronouncement might not have been intended to
deal with those "solely religious laws" that operate neither directly
nor indirectly to coerce nonobserving persons. 92 In any case,
since the governmental program in issue in Engel did operate in-
directly to compel dissenters, the decision should not, and may not,
be read for the proposition that the establishment clause bars all
solely religious programs by government. 93
Close examination of the positions taken by the two amici
curiae also indicates that they perhaps meant less than would in-
itially appear. To illustrate the thesis that the establishment clause
is violated whenever government undertakes or sponsors a religious
program, the argument was made that "the holding of a Mass in
a public school during the regular day would violate the Establish-
ment Clause even though all non-Catholic pupils were permitted
or required to absent themselves."'94 This would be unconstitu-
tional, but not simply for the reason that the state was "sponsoring
[a] religious program"; an establishment clause violation would
occur because the minority dissenters would be under the same
social pressures from the Catholic majority as the dissenters were
in Engel.'95 Remove the coercive effect of the public school at-
Mr. Justice Stewart chidingly questioned whether "the Court [was]
suggesting that the Constitution permits judges and Congressmen and
Presidents to join in prayer, but prohibits school children from doing so?"
Id. at 450 n.9. The answer would seem to be that (1) the case at bar
involved only school children and (2) the pressures inherent in the public
school setting may constitutionally distinguish it from the other situations
mentioned.
190. 370 U.S. at 430.
191. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
192. This conclusion is supported by the opinion's explicit recognition,
immediately following its broad statement, that laws that place the "power
... and prestige of government ... behind a particular religious belief"
plainly result in indirect coercive pressures. 370 U.S. at 431.
193. But see Sutherland, supra note 165, at 35-36.
194. Brief of American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith as Amici Curiae, p. 17, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
195. See 25 CAL. OPS. ATr'Y GEN. 319 (1955). This assumes that a
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mosphere and have the Mass held in the public school on Sun-
day, and a significantly different question is presented."' 0 Further,
these amici's thesis was documented by citing McCollum,",7 as
was the proposition advanced by the other amici that the first
amendment's ban on establishment would be violated by state "par-
ticipation in religious affairs."' s The sound basis for McCollum,
however, is the presence of inherent compulsion. 99
C. DISTINGUISHING THE INDISTINGUISHABLE
Acceptance of the proposed constitutional standard not only ef-
fectively circumscribes the Engel decision, but also provides a ready
means for distinguishing between situations heretofore found by
some to be indistinguishable. For example, Mr. Justice Jackson,'
seconded by several commentators,2°' charged that McCollum's
program of this sort would only be instituted if there were a Catholic
majority. Cf. Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 695, 166 N.W. 202,
203 (1918); Williams v. Board of Trustees, 172 Ky. 133, 364 Mo. 121,
129-31, 260 S.W.2d 573, 576-78 (1953). If for some reason this were
not the case, the result should be the same because of the program's in-
fluence on Roman Catholic students who would not attend Mass other-
wise, see text accompanying notes 221, 439-53 infra, and because of the
influence on free religious choice generated by the public school sponsor-
ship of such an activity. See text accompanying notes 244-46 infra.
196. See text accompanying notes 129-47 supra.
197. Brief of American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith as Amici Curiae, p. 17, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
198. Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community
Relations Advisory Council as Amici Curiae, p. 15, Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
199. It must be noted, however, that the Pfeffer brief argued that if
the state's "conduct is religious, then it is outside the competence andjurisdiction of the State or its instrumentalities, and even if participation
were not compulsory, the conduct would be unconstitutional." Id. at 17.
The scope of this standard is not clear. From the context, it would not
seem to apply only to the state's undertaking solely religious activities in
the public schools and granting dissenters the right of nonparticipation; it
seems to say that all solely religious activities by the state are barred. This
is a matter that was clearly not in issue in Engel, and such a thesis is
clearly unworkable and unacceptable. See text accompanying notes 140-44
supra. Even if this standard is meant to apply only to those governmental
activities that require participation (the context of the statement does
lend credence to this), query if these can be found to violate the establish-
ment clause if it can be shown that they are neither inherently compulsive
(as only mature adults may be involved) nor involve a substantial use of
public funds. See note 182 supra. It is difficult to differentiate such a
case from "In God We Trust" on coins and currency.
200. See Kunzv. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 311 n.10 (1951) (dissenting
opinion); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 569 (1948) (dissenting
opinion).
201. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 3, 7-8 (1949); Taylor, Equal Protection of Religion:
Today's Public School Problem, 38 A.B.A.J. 277-78 (1952).
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ban from the public schools of the solely religious activity of re-
leased time, a fortiori, determined the question of whether the state
was permitted to bar the solely religious activities of some people
in the public streets and parks. The theory was that since McCol-
lum forbade the use of tax-supported school property by any and
all sects for the propagation of religion, it was patently anoma-
lous for the Court to hold, as it did, 2' that the state was compel-
led to permit the nondiscriminate use of tax-supported street and
park property for that same purpose. 0 3 It is not difficult to
combat this analysis. The effect of the activity in McCollum was
to coerce those who were either unwilling to participate or unin-
terested in doing so. This evil-a significant constitutional ingre-
dient-is not present when the public streets or parks are used
for religious purposes. No citizen who declines to participate is
in any way compelled to do so, and therefore, no person's religious
liberty is impaired.
One writer has stated that he is at a loss to determine "why
it is constitutional for a public institution to purchase a sectarian
book [such as the Gideon Bible], but not to enable its pupils to
read such books as gifts ... ."204 The explanation is the same."°'
While no one has ever argued that dissenters are compelled to
desert their religious convictions because public school libraries
contain sectarian literature, there has been expert testimony that
public school sponsorship of the distribution of Bibles creates coer-
cive pressures to do soY.06
202. See cases cited note 200 supra.
203. Professor Corwin put it this way:
[T]he discrepancy between the two holdings is apparent. In one
[McCollum] it is held that a school board may not constitutionally
permit religious groups to use on an equal footing any part of a
school building for the purpose of religious instruction to those who
wish to receive it. By the other [Saia] the public authorities are under
a constitutional obligation to turn over public parks for religious
propaganda to be hurled at all and sundry whether they wish to re-
ceive it or not. The Court seems to cherish a strange tenderness for
outri religious manifestations which contrasts sharply with its attitude
toward organized religion.
Corwin, supra note 201, at 8.
204. Lieberman, A General Interpretation of Separation of Church and
State and Its Implications for Public Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDU-
CATION 129, 131 (1956).
205. Another reason for distinguishing these situations might be that
the state has a secular educational aim in placing Bibles in public school
libraries-to make this literature available for academic investigation. See
text accompanying notes 333-37 infra. No such secular purpose is found
in sponsoring Bible distribution. The goal of the Gideons International is
to "win men and women for the Lord Jesus Christ." Tudor v. Board of
Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 33, 100 A.2d 857, 858 (1953).
206. Id. at 50, 100 A.2d at 867. See notes 501-09 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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In upholding the New York released time plan in Zorach v.
Clauson, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas, implied that
such solely religious activity is equivalent to "prayers in our legisla-
tive halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief
Executive; [and] the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a
holiday ... ."' Several state courts have sustained public
school Bible reading on similar bases. 213 Because of the presence
of inherent coercion, it seems that Zorach was incorrectly decid-
ed209 and that daily Bible reading in the public schools is also
unconstitutional. 10 Whether or not the other activities referred to
are constitutionally valid, it is fairly clear that they are not in-
herently coercive, and therefore, they should not control the dis-
position of Bible reading and released time.
Relying on the governmental activities referred to by Mr. Justice
Douglas, the House Committee on the Judiciary made the same
faulty analogy when it stated that the inclusion of the words "un-
der God" in the pledge of allegiance to the flag did not run afoul
of the establishment clause.21 Immature dissenters from the
amended flag pledge will surely be subject to the same coercive
pressures in the public school as were the children in Engel. Be-
cause of this, whether the amended pledge to the flag will with-
stand attack should turn on whether it may be fairly characterized
as a solely religious activity.212
In a recent comprehensive article dealing with religion in the
public schools, one writer has urged that "the Constitution directs
the public school to be a completely secular agency" and that it
"proscribes the use of public school funds, facilities, personnel,
time, sponsorship, auspices, or authority for religious instruction,
practice, or ritual, or for any other religious or religiously-orient-
ed purpose, direct or indirect."213 Under this standard, not only
were prayers, Bible reading, and released time found to be uncon-
stitutional, but so also was the objective or academic study of re-
ligion.2 4 "On the other hand, where information or ideas about
religion are intrinsic to the subjects in the school's normal secular
207. 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952).
208. E.g., Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, -, 179 A.2d 698, 702 (19--
62); Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 7, 109 S.W. 115, 118 (1908).
209. See text accompanying notes 397-403 infra.
210. See text accompanying notes 61-66 supra, 251-94 infra.
211. H.R. REP. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954).
212. For discussion of this question, see text accompanying notes 536-41
infra.
213. Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools,
22U. Pr. L. Rav. 561, 570 (1961).
2' A Id. at 571-78. "Teaching religious doctrine, under any heading, is
forbidden." Id. at 578.
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curriculum, such as history, art, literature, etc., they should be pre-
sented factually and objectively."21 Why a single course in com-
parative religion makes the school less of a "secular agency" than
does the infiltration of religious matter into every other course in
the curriculum is unclear. Why the one, and not the other, in-
directly instructs in religion is also a mystery. The source of the
difficulty seems to be the generality of the standard and the result-
ing perplexity in its application. Not so, hopefully, with the con-
stitutional standard proposed here.216
Finally, it should be noted that use of this suggested standard
would even seem to satisfy those, at least for the time being, who
contend that since the language of the fourteenth amendment bars
only the denial of liberty, "so far as the fourteenth amendment is
concerned, states are entirely free to establish religions, provided
that they do not deprive anybody of religious liberty. '21 7
D. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES CARRIED ON WITHOUT OBJECTION
The seemingly broad standard suggested in Engel, as well as
the rather sweeping criteria advocated by amici curiae in that
case, may be read as stating that any governmental program that
is solely religious violates the establishment clause. Under such a
reading, there is no question as to the unconstitutionality of such
a program, even when no one objects to it. However, since the con-
stitutional principle of the proposed constitutional standard is
grounded in the sanctity of the religious and conscientious scruples
of public school children, a question does arise as to the extent of
its application to a situation in which the public school engages
in a solely religious practice and there is no opposition by the at-
tending school children or their parents.
In the two cases in which the Supreme Court has found a
practice of this sort to be contrary to the establishment clause,
there were conscientious dissenters who instituted the litigation.18
Thus, if the rationale of these two cases is to be explained on the
basis of the proposed constitutional standard, the decisions must
be narrowly read to hold no more than that the establishment clause
215. Ibid.
216. For discussion of the application of the proposed standard to the
various religious aspects in the public schools, see text accompanying notes
229-566 infra.
217. Corwin, supra note 201, at 19. See also note 8 supra. It is interest-
ing to theorize whether the establishment of an approved church by a
state could be considered an infringement of religious liberty. See text
accompanying note 183 supra.
218. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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is violated when a public school engages in a solely religious
practice that is objected to by nonconforming students in atten-
dance; if there are no dissenters, the practice may be valid even
if, by its nature, it will likely result in compromising of religious
beliefs or influencing of the students' freedom of conscientious
choice. Furthermore, it may be argued that under prevailing stand-
ing requirements, only the parents of a student whose religious be-
liefs would preclude participation in the school program could be
permitted to challenge its constitutionality.219
However, the rationale that underlies the proposed constitu-
tional standard calls for rejection of the above conclusions. De-
spite the fact that the privilege of nonparticipation is extended to
religious nonconformists, the societal pressures on children to take
part in state-sponsored religious activities often result in their choos-
ing to do so in preference to suffering embarrassment among
their peers. This being the fact, if the constitutionality of solely
religious activities turns on whether opposition is voiced, these
programs most often will be carried on without objection despite
the fact that there are nonconformist pupils whose conscientious
scruples are being compromised." ' Even if all the pupils are
nominally members of the same religious sect, very likely solely
religious programs of that sect conducted in the public schools
will result, due to the inherent coercive pressures, in those students
with marginal religious convictions being influenced in their free-
dom of religious choice.22' Because of these same social pres-
sures, the results of inquiries made by public school officials or
parent groups to determine whether all students would be willing
to participate in a public school religious activity will probably
not reflect the true feelings of those polled.m- Parents who are
219. See text accompanying notes 154-63 supra.
220. Cf. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U.
CI. L. REv. 1, 65-66 (1962), for the view that under the rule of Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the uncounselled indigent defendant is
caught in a similar vicious circle.
221. Hypothetically, if all of the students of a public school are of
the Roman Catholic faith and it is therefore decided to have a daily Mass
in the school with attendance being voluntary, the inherent pressures on
those non-churchgoing Roman Catholic children to attend this Mass might
well be greater than are the pressures on children of minority faiths to
take part in majority religious activities.
222. For a decision stating that the unanimous consent of all parents
could not save the ceding of public school control to church authorities,
see Williams v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 726, 191 S.W. 507, 514(1917). For a similar case in which the complainant appeared originally
to have given his acquiescence, see Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691,
700, 166 N.W. 202, 205 (1918).
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religious dissenters usually refuse to instruct their children to de-
cline to participate because of the fear of their children being sub-
jected to ridicule.223 Many hesitate to institute litigation because
of this and because of "the prospect of disrupted community life,
with perhaps devastating consequences to the minority groups them-
selves, that would result from arbitrary interference with deep-seat-
ed community customs." '224 The upshot of all of this would be
that those values cherished in our society, which are at the founda-
tion of the standard set forth in this article, would be emasculated
by the rule that only those public school religious programs that
are in fact objected to by attending students or their parents are
unconstitutional. Prophylactic treatment is necessary. The law
should be that those solely religious practices in the public schools
that are likely to influence free religious choice or to compromise
conscientiously held beliefs are per se unconstitutional.
Empirical studies in the church-state field have shown that
judicial determinations of unconstitutionality do not substantially
deter communities from engaging in patently invalid practices.2z
Thus, the burden of policing falls upon the courts and ultimately
upon those willing to risk the time, expense, and hazards, of liti-
gation. If only those parents of attending children who conscien-
tiously oppose public school religious actions were to have standing
to attack them, many of these programs would go unchallenged
despite the fact that the very values that are afforded the pro-
tection of the first amendment. are being submerged. The "right"
protected in these instances-the "right" to be free from social
223.
[T"he children's father testified that after careful consideration he had
decided that he should not have [the children] excused from attendance
at these morning ceremonies. Among his reasons were the following.
He said that he thought his children would be "labelled as 'odd balls'"
before their teachers and classmates every school day; that children
... . were liable "to lump all particular religious difference[s] or
religious objections [together] as 'atheism'" and that today the word
"atheism" is often connected with "atheistic communism", and has
"very bad" connotations, such as "un-American" or "pro-Red", with
overtones of possible immorality.
Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815, 818 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris.
noted, 371 U.S. 807 (1962).
224. Johnson, Summary of Policies and Recommendations of the Ameri-
can Council on Education Committee on Religion and Education, in THE
STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 9 (1958).
See also Harry Golden, quoted in PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREE-
DOM 304 (1953); Sullivan, Religious Education in the Schools, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 92 (1949). For an extremely forceful documentation of
this point, see PFEFFER, supra at 402-04.
225. See Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court
Decision, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 777, 784-86 (1959).
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pressures to conform to the majority's religious practices that are
governmentally sponsored-depends upon anonymity for its ef-
fective vindication. To require that it be claimed by those affected
themselves would result in substantial nullification of the "right"
at the very moment of its assertion. -6 It would therefore be ap-
propriate here for the Court to fashion an exception to the general
requirement of standing because of the weighty countervailing
policy of adequately securing these "rights."
2 -
III. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD
As has been observed by another proponent of a constitutional
standard for church-state controversies, "the genius of... Ameri-
can constitutional law [is] that its growth and principles are measur-
226. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449. 459
(1958).
227. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960). The precise
questions of upon whom standing should be conferred and how this may
be accomplished doctrinally is beyond the scope of this article. The Supreme
Court has permitted litigants to assert the constitutional rights of others,
but none of the decided cases appear to be wholly satisfactory in solving
the problem at hand. Professor Kenneth Davis has pointed out that this
permission has been, and should be, granted much more liberally once the
litigant has properly commenced a proceeding to vindicate his own rights.
3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.07 (1958). This doctrine
is not very helpful here. Other cases may be explained on the basis of the
fact that the litigant will suffer direct economic injury as a result of the
state enactment. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
These, too, are not very useful.
However, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
the Court permi'ted an association to act as the representative of its members
in asserting their rights. Similar to the problem at hand, the rights of the
NAACP members would have been nullified if the individuals themselves
would have been required to assert them. By analogy, perhaps associations
composed of religious dissenters may initiate proceedings. Perhaps it may
also be said that such an association "is but the medium through which
its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their
own views." 357 U.S. at 459. But NAACP v. Alabama also stressed the
fact, not likely to be present in the case at hand, that there was "reasonable
likelihood that the Association itself through diminished financial support
and membership may be adversely affected" by the governmental action.
Id. at 459-60.
Furthermore, the membership of many associations of minority religious
groups is well known. In such instances, an action by the association will
redound to the members, thus causing the members to discourage associa-
tion action for the reasons discussed previously. Granting standing to the
parent of 'any attending child, irrespective of religious conviction, on the
ground that to force the parent to assert prejudice will expose the child
to opprobrium would also probably be inadequate. Parents would realize
that whether or not they were in fact religious dissenters, they would be
so publicly regarded. It would seem that full protection can be afforded
only by a more relaxed standing criterion. But see Sutherland, Establish-
ment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 42 (1962).
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ed in terms of concrete factual situations .... ,,228 Thus, it would
be helpful to examine some of the many actual instances of re-
ligious intrusion into the public schools, and to determine their
constitutional validity when measured by the proposed constitu-
tional standard.
A. PRAYERS
The prayer at issue in Engel v. Vitale, neutral and inoffensive
as it was, 29 would fail the proposed constitutional test on several
counts. Its purpose and effect was admittedly solely religious. The
context in which it was delivered was inherently coercive. Due to
its theistic basis, it would likely infringe on the conscientious be-
liefs of some members of the heterogeneous school population.
However, it need not logically follow that every public school
prayer would similarly fail. First, if it were possible to devise a
prayer against which no one could raise any conscientious objec-
tion, it could not be said that its recitation would result in the
compromising or influencing of anyone's religious beliefs or choice.
Such a prayer would therefore be free from constitutional attack
under the proposed standard. Although projects have been un-
dertaken to attempt to satisfy this requirement,23 the obstacles
appear to be insurmountable. Certainly, the Regents' prayer hav-
ing been rejected, any prayer that invokes the aid or blessing of
the Deity runs afoul of this test. Not only would such a prayer
228. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1,5 (1961).
229. Compare the daily prayer offered by teachers in Hackett v.
Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 614-15, 87 S.W. 792, 793
(1905):
Our Father who art in Heaven, we ask Thy aid in our day's work.
Be with us in all we do and say. Give us wisdom and strength and
patience to teach these children as they should be taught. May teacher
and pupil have mutual love and respect. Watch over these children,
both in schoolroom and on the playground. Keep them from being
hurt in any way, and at last, when we come to die, may none of our
number be missing around Thy Throne. These things we ask for
Christ's sake. Amen.
This prayer was found not to be "sectarian," and therefore outside the
state constitution's prohibition. Whether or not one agrees with the Ken-
tucky court's definition of "sectarian," there is no question that this prayer
is a "religious" exercise under the establishment clause. If recited in the
same setting as the Regents' prayer, it would be invalid, under Engel or the
proposed constitutional standard, even if the reference to Christ were
omitted.
230. See Abbott, A Common Bible Reader For Public Schools, 56 RE-
LIGIOUS EDUCATION 20 (1961); Note, 22 ALBANY L. REV. 156-57 (1958).
Efforts to find a commonly acceptable prayer for American citizens are
not confined to our time; Benjamin Franklin was among those who pre-
viously made the attempt. See Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 660-62,
191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 459-60 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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cause conscientious objections to be raised by atheists, agnos-
tics,ml and humanists, =2 but it also appears that at least one
of the three chief faiths would have religious objections.' It
has been shown that when many of the attempts to distill a "com-
mon core" or nonsectarian religion are scrutinized, the product
"comes to mean the common core of orthodox Protestant belief,
and . what a substantial majority-not of all, but of the be-
lieving-agree upon. '234 Furthermore, theologiansm and educa-
tors"e have pointed out that aside from the fact that the task is
extraordinarily difficult, even if it were possible, the result would
probably be the reduction of theology to triviality and the creation
of a public school sect that would be objectionable to all religious
faiths. Moreover, it is likely that some people would conscien-
tiously resist participation in any public supplication, regardless
of its content.
Second, if it were possible to find that the prayer recitation had
some independent primary secular purpose, it then could not be
characterized as a solely religious activity and would thus avoid
this requisite for unconstitutionality. Several endeavors of this
nature have already been found wanting.' The assertion that
the prayer's purpose would be "to prepare the children for their
work, to quiet them from the outside," should probably also
231. See Vishny, The Constitution and Religion in the Public Schools,
Decalbgue J., June-July 1960, pp. 4, 6.
232. See Nichols, Religion and Education in a Free Society, in RELIGION
IN AMERICA 148, 157 (1958).
233.
Jews believe . . . that when a faith in God is taught, it must be
achieved in the context of historical associations accompanied by re-
ligious rites and symbols that are related to that particular religious
group. . . . We do not appreciate the vague and undefined God to
which the "American religion" offers lip service. We do not want our
children to think of God only in abstract terms, nor in Christian
terms.... This is a task, therefore, only for the home, synagogue or
church.
Gilbert, A Catalogue of Church-State Problems, 56 RELIGIOUs EDUCATION
424, 428 (1961). See also note 73 supra.
234. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 308 (1953). See also
Comm. on Religion and Education, Am. Council on Education, Religion
in Public Education, 42 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 129, 161 (1947), which
stated that permitting instruction in a common core religion "would be, at
best, to assume that the support of an overwhelming majority of the
people justified overriding the convictions of a minority."
235. Nichols, supra note 232, at 157-58.
236. American Council on Education, quoted in PFEFFER, op. cit. supra
note 234, at 308-09.
237. See text accompanying notes 32-42 supra.
238. Billard v. Board of Educ., 69 Kan. 53, 58, 76 Pac. 422, 423 (1904)
(Lord's Prayer and Twenty-Third Psalm). See also Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 7 NJ. Super. 442, 454, 71 A.2d 732, 740 (Super. Ct. 1950).
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230fail, either because of disingenousness, or because it would
seem that if the prayer did produce placidity, it would be due
originally to its religious effect.
240
Third, if the circumstances under which the prayer were to be
recited could be so molded as to remove the likelihood that
there would be infringement or influencing of any student's reli-
gious or conscientious principles, it would be free from challenge
despite its solely religious nature. One suggestion toward this end
has been that only one student each day be invited to read the
prayer while the others simply remain silent.24' The difficulty
with this is that the same social compulsion that operates on stu-
dents to participate in group recitation would seem to operate here
to force a dissenter to take his turn at reading before the class. 2 '
Even if only the teacher were to recite the prayer, with the students
simply listening in silence, the result should probably be the same.
It is likely that the conscientious scruples of some students would
forbid even this quantum of "participation" in what is clearly a
devotional exercise.2 4' Therefore, they would be inherently com-
pelled to compromise their scruples. Furthermore, it is most rea-
sonable to believe that the reading of a prayer, each and every
day, "buttressed with the authority of the State and, more im-
portantly to children, backed with the authority of their teachers,
can hardly do less than inculcate or promote the inculcation of
various religious doctrines in childish minds. '244 Educators have
239. The proponent of this justification herself conceded that the prayer
recitation "was religious to the children that are religious, and to the
others it was not." Billard v. Board of Educ., 69 Kan. 53, 58, 76 Pac. 422,
423 (1904). The court, in sustaining the practice did not do so on the
ground that the prayer recitation was not a religious activity. Rather, it
found that the exercises "were not a form of religious worship or the teach-
ing of sectarian or religious doctrine" as forbidden by the state constitution.
Ibid.
240. If the mere recitation of any reading would accomplish the teacher's
goal, then, as indicated in the text, the practice may not be characterized
as a solely religious activity and it is not, for that reason, violative of the
establishment clause. However, the establishment clause may be violated
for another reason. Although the practice would have the immediate secu-
lar end of maintaining order, it would also have the immediate effect of
promoting religion. Since, by virtue of the above analysis that saves this
practice from being a solely religious activity, the secular end obviously
could be just as well attained by means that do not promote religion (e.g.,
recitation of one of Shakespeare's sonnets), the selection of a reading that
furthers religion should be unconstitutional. Accord, McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 466-67 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
241. See Engel v. Vitale, 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 348-49, 206 N.Y.S.2d
183, 191 (1960) (Beldock, J., separate opinion).
242. This has occurred. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
243. See Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 401 (E.D. Pa.
1959).
244. Id. at 404. Cf. The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
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expressed the opinion that even a single instance of school ap-
probation of certain religious principles might have this effect.
2 05
Surely, the ddily repetition of devotional exercises will likely result
in instilling religious values, thereby affecting the immature stu-
dents' freedom of conscientious choice.240 Many students will be
influenced to engage more actively in religious endeavors, and the
effect of this practice might be to cause pupils of dissenting re-
ligious faiths to compromise their scruples.
Several other suggestions merit consideration. One has been "to
have each school day commence with a quiet moment that would
still the tumult of the playground and start a day of study."2 7
Since each student could utilize this moment of silence for any
purpose he saw fit, the activity may not be fairly characterized
as solely religious, and since no student would really know the
subject of his classmates' reflections, no one could in any way be
compelled to alter his thoughts. However, the proposal of recita-
tion of the words of a song that invoke or make other hallowed
references to the Deity as a replacement for a traditional prayer 48
falls into a different category. Even if the singing of such a song
in the public schools were wholly unobjectionable, -4 9 the recita-
tion of its words as a devotional exercise transforms its entire
complexion. This is clearly no more than the designation of an of-
ficial prayer, irrespective of by whom it is done, and it is invalid
for reasons previously mentioned.2w
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. REV. 427, 433
(1953):
The child who, for example, is compelled to attend a segregated
school may be able to cope with ordinary expressions of prejudice by
regarding the prejudiced person as evil or misguided; but he cannot
readily cope with symbols of authority, the full force of the authority
of the State-the school or the school board, in this instance-in the
same manner.
See also Levy, Views from the Wall-Reflections on Church-State Rela-
tionships, 29 HENNEPIN LAW. 51, 55 (1961).
245. See Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 51-52, 100 A.2d 857,
868 (1953). But see text accompanying notes 524-25 infra.
246. Cf. Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952), in which
the court permitted occasional public school religious activities, but held
invalid the continuous availability of religious pamphlets.
247. Editorial, Washington Post, June 28, 1962, § A, p. 22, col. 2.
See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1962, § 1, p. 18, col. 2.
248. See N.Y. Times, July 29, 1962, § 1, p. 36, col. 4; id., Aug. 10,
1962, § 1, p. 21, col. 1; id., Aug. 30, 1962, § 1, p. 18, col. 3.
249. See text accompanying notes 541-44 infra.
250. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
19631
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
B. BIBLE READING
Past and present, one of the most prevalent solely religious prac-
tices carried on in the public schools has been Bible reading.2"'
Its legality and constitutionality have evoked a glut of litigation
in the state courts and a surfeit of writing by legal and lay com-
mentators. The Supreme Court has managed to elude the prob-
lem in the past,2" 2 but appears finally to be compelled to adjudi-
cate it on the merits. 53 By any reasonable test, this practice
should be unconstitutional.M
The prime reason advanced by many state courts for sustaining
the practice is that since the Bible is a nonsectarian document,
no single religious sect benefits from its use. 2" This factor is
crucial under many state constitutional provisions that prohibit
"sectarian" teaching in the public schools.256 However, it is ir-
relevant as far as the first amendment is concerned since, under
the Everson dictum, "state action violates the ban .. . if it aids
all religions on a nonpreferential basis. ' 257 Under the proposed
constitutional standard, the question of whether the Bible is sec-
tarian is likewise inconsequential. This solely religious practice
would be invalid so long as it is likely to cause any student, even
if he belongs to no religious sect, to have his conscientious con-
victions influenced or compromised.2 58
However, it should be made plain that no version of the Bible
may be fairly characterized as nonsectarian, even in the sense that
none of the major religious faiths find it unobjectionable. The
earliest challenges to Bible reading in the American public schools
were leveled by members of the Roman Catholic faith, who con-
251. A recent survey estimates that 42% of American public schools
have daily Bible reading. Geographically, the breakdown is: East-68%;
South-77%; Midwest-18%; West-l1l%. Dierenfield, The Extent of
Religious Influence in American Public Schools, 56 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
173, 176 (1961).
252. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960); Doremus v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
253. See note 3 supra. The Court had little choice but to hear the
Schempp case since it was appealable as a matter of right under § 1253
of the Judicial Code, and the three-judge court below had found that
public school Bible reading was contrary to the establishment clause.
254. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
255. See e.g., People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac.
610 (1927); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. (o.s.) 417 (Mass.
Police Ct. 1859); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880
(1950); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967
(1890).
256. See cases cited in note 255 supra; PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND
FREEDOM 387 (1953).
257. Id. at 391.
258. For examples, see text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
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scientiously objected to the use of the King James version." 9 Al-
though there has been some indication that this position is in a
state of flux,260 recent litigation has again been undertaken by
Catholic parents.261  Unitarians, 2 ' members of the Jewish
faith,26 Buddhists,2" and atheists2l have all asserted in the
courts that public school Bible reading offends their religious and
conscientious beliefs. Universalists and some Lutherans and Bap-
tists also oppose the activity. 66
A number of state courts, although a minority, have recognized
the fact that no version of the Bible is acceptable to everyone .26
Theologians of all faiths encounter no difficulty in arriving at
this conclusion.268 The Roman Catholic religion finds only the
Douay version of the Bible acceptable;269 despite an assertion to
the contrary,27 "a Catholic child commits a grave sin if he
knowingly owns or reads from the Protestant version of the Bib-
le."' Very recently, Catholic parents protested a New Jersey
community's requirement that their children listen to readings
from a King James Bible. 2  The Roman Catholic position has
259. See e.g., Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854); Common-
wealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. (o.s.) 417 (Mass. Police Ct. 1859); Nessle
v. Hum, 1 Ohio N.P. 140 (C.P. 1894); Hart v. School Dist., 2 Lancaster
L. Rev. 346 (Pa. C.P. 1885). See also Boyer, Religious Education of
Public School Pupils in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REV. 181.
260. See Reed, Another Tradition at Stake, Catholic Action, Feb., 1950,
p. 4 .
261. E.g., Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953).
262. Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
263. Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So.
116 (1915); Church v. Bullock, 100 S.W. 1025 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
264. Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109 (1955).
265. Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962).
266. 2 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 571 (1950).
267. E.g., Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54, 222
Pac. 801 (1924); Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895
(1922); People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251
(1910); State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W. 846 (1900).
268. See Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 401-02 (E.D.
Pa. 1959); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 NJ. 31, 46-47, 100 A.2d 857,
865 (1953); Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law, 36 MARQ. L. REV.
24, 44 (1952).
269. People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Il1. 334, 343-45, 92
N.E. 251, 254 (1910); State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369,
383, 173 Pac. 35, 39 (1918).
270. See Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 1040,
68 So. 116, 118 (1915).
271. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 256, at 384. See also authorities cited
in Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22
U. Pri. L. REV. 561, 571 n.49 (1961).
272. Pfeffer & Baum, Public School Sectarianism and the Jewish Child
31 (American Jewish Congress, May, 1957). Roman Catholics "are for-
bidden . . . to listen to any version of [the Bible] unauthorized by the
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been that the King James version is filled with error and false
explanations and is used "as an instrument of proselytism."' 3
The Protestant stand regarding the Douay translation of the Bible
is similar in many respects to the Roman Catholic feeling about
the King James version. 4
The Jewish faith finds the New Testament, whether it be the
Douay or King James version, incompatible with Hebrew teach-
ings.275 Of course, nonbelievers find the dogmatism of every ver-
sion of the Bible as an imposition on their conscientious scruples." '
Nonetheless, the argument has been made that the Old Testament
is generally immune from objection.7 7 Even discounting those
minor religious groups that "in this country . . . are numerically
small and, in point of impact upon our national life, negligible, 27 8
this argument is far from being accurate. Unitarians have testified
that much of the Old Testament's content is contrary to their
faith. 79 A Jewish theologian has pointed out that there were
specific instances in which the King James Old Testament had been
Roman Catholic Church." CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 524, cited in Tyree,
Should What Is Rendered To God Be Commanded By Caesar?, 44 PHIl
DELTA KAPPAN 74, 76 (1962).
273. Encyclicals of the Popes, quoted in Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 24,
Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959). See PFEFFER,
op. cit. supra note 256, at 384:
[T]he translators' dedicatory preface [to the King James version] states
that the purpose of the translation was to give 'such a blow unto that
Man of Sin (the Pope) as will not be healed [and] to make God's
holy truth to be yet more and more known to the people whom they
("Papist persons at home or abroad") desire still to be kept in ig-
norance.'
274. See People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 344-45,
92 N.E. 251, 254 (1910); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 47, 100
A.2d 857, 865 (1953).
275. See Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 154-55,
214 N.W. 18, 22-23 (1927) (dissenting opinion); Comment, 43 ILL. L.
REV. 374, 382 (1948); 27 TEXAS L. REV. 256, 258 (1948).
276. See Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 374, 382 (1948).
277. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 448, 75 A.2d 880, 886
(1950).
278. Id. at 449, 75 A.2d at 887.
279.
In content, the father objected to material in the Old Testament re-
garding blood sacrifices, uncleanness, and leprosy, together with the
whole concept of the Old Testament God which was contrary to the
concept of deity which he endeavored to instill in his children. He
testified that he did not want his children to acquire an image of
Jehovah, the God of vengeance. He pointed out that in the very midst
of the Ten Commandments was a verse asserting that God would visit
the sins of the father upon the fourth generation . .. and the wit-
ness went on to assert that this concept of God was in sharp contrast
with the God of his own church . . ..
Brief for Plaintiffs, pp. 5-6, Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398
(E.D. Pa. 1959).
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imbued with a Christological significance.' ° Clearly, there is no
"English text of the Old Testament accepted fully by the several
faiths.,-s
Recognizing this inherent weakness of any complete version of
the Bible, it has been suggested that the defect may be remedied
by selecting those portions in any version that are in no way re-
ligious, but contain only moral principles that are common to all
men.' If this could be done, the practice would be valid under
the proposed standard. Not only could it not be fairly characteriz-
ed as solely religious, but no one's conscientious beliefs could pos-
sibly be affected. The difficulty is that those who have advocated
this course have concluded, somewhat contradictorily, that there is
no one competent to select these portions.' Even if it be assumed
that such Biblical passages may exist, until there is at least a
general consensus as to which ones they are, the establishment
clause should forbid any individual or group from choosing some
and causing them to be read in the public schools. If this were
permitted, for reasons previously advanced,' it is very likely
that infractions of religious liberty would occur and go unredress-
ed.
Other attempts have been made to justify the constitutionality
of public school Bible reading. They also fail on examination.
Several state courts have excused the practice on the ground that
dissenters are afforded the right of nonparticipation.2s The in-
adequacy and fictitiousness of this position have already been be-
labored." 6 Others have attempted to validate the practice because
280. Dr. Solomon Grayzel, cited id. at p. 10.
281. Committee on Religion and Public Education of the National
Council of the Churches of Christ, Relation of Religion to Public Education
-A Study Document, International J. of Religious Education, Apr. 1960,
pp. 21, 28.
282. See People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 286-93, 255
Pac. 610, 615-17 (1927); Harpster, supra note 268, at 45.
283. Ibid. See also Comment, 43 ILL. L. REv. 374, 382 (1948): "How-
ever carefully selections for reading may be chosen it is inevitable that
some students will be forced to listen to portions which they cannot ac-
cept."
284. See text accompanying notes 219-24 supra.
285. E.g., People ex rel, Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 293, 255
Pac. 610, 617 (1927); Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruc-
tion, 143 So. 2d 21, 31 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962); Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ.,
118 Mich. 560, 562-63, 77 N.W. 250, 251 (1898); Kaplan v. Independent
School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 151, 214 N.W. 18, 21 (1927).
286. The consistency of holding, on the one hand, that the Bible is non-
sectarian and then holding, on the other hand, that it is saved from religious
liberty objection because of the right of nonparticipation has long been
questioned. See People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 351,
92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910); Note, 3 RUTGERs L. REv. 115, 125 (1949). This
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it does not transform the public school into a " place of wor-
ship."2 7 While this contention may satisfy some state constitu-
tional prerequisites, it has no bearing vis-a-vis the establishment
clause.
A provision that the reading of the Bible be done without
comment has often been submitted as a sustaining feature.288 This
argument ignores the fact that to some sects, "the reading in pub-
lic of any portion of any version of the Scriptures unaccompanied
by authoritative comment or explanation, or the reading of it pri-
vately by persons not commissioned by the church to do so, is ob-
jectionable, and an offense to their religious feelings .... 1,289
In addition, since other readings in the curriculum are subjected
to critical comment and scrutiny, there is reasonable likelihood
that the practice of reading the Bible without discerning com-
ment "will tend to the acceptance by those pupils of the statements
in the selections as true. '290 Finally, the daily repetition of this
activity, in some schools for a substantial segment of time, 9'
under the sponsorship of school and teacher will surely have its
effect 292 even if done without comment. 293 These points also
dilemma would be solved only if Bible reading could be characterized as
a secular activity. See text accompanying notes 117-25 supra. It is clear
that this may not be done.
287. E.g., Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475 (1884);
Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792
(1905).
288. E.g., Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718 (1956).
289. State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 871, 91 N.W.
846, 847 (1902). For further documentation of this in regard to the
Roman Catholic position, see note 272 supra; Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 25,
Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
290. Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ., 118 Mich. 560, 578, 77 N.W. 250,
257 (1898) (dissenting opinion). Of interest also is the following statement
in State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 194-95, 44 N.W. 967,
973 (1890):
A most forcible demonstration . . . is found in certain reports of
the American Bible Society of its work in Catholic countries . . .
in which instances are given of the conversion of several persons
from 'Romanism' through the reading of the scriptures alone; that is
to say, the reading of the Protestant or King James version of the
Bible converted Catholics to Protestants without the aid of comment
or exposition.
291. In Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So.
2d 21, 31 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962), the court noted that Bible reading con-
sumed from three to five minutes each day.
292. Dean Weigle has written that "the message of the Bible is the
central thing . . . .The Bible contains the Word of God to man." Quoted
in Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 14, Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398
(E.D. Pa. 1959).
293. Notice again the inconsistency between finding the Bible to be
nonsectarian and, at the same time, finding no infringement of religious
liberty only because it is read without comment. See note 286 supra; Note,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 611 (1960).
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overcome the defenses occasionally asserted that the mere reading
of the Bible denotes no implication as to the truth or falsity of
the subject matter and that merely listening to it compels no stu-
dent to believe in what he has heard.294
1. Teaching of Moral Values
The argument is frequently made that Bible reading, religious
study, and other devotional exercises in the public schools are in-
dispensable to teaching students moral values and qualities, and
that this is a vital function of our public schools in teaching good
citizenship and in combating "Godless Communism."' If this
means that the only available method for inculcating students with
these values is first to imbue them with religious ideals, then re-
gardless of how important this may be, the establishment clause
should forbid the training. 9 6
However, the prospects for the public schools' producing good
citizens are not quite so bleak. There is ample evidence that re-
ligion in general education is unnecessary to produce better child
behavior;297 moral values may be very effectively taught without
the aid of religion.29 "However we [citizens of the American de-
mocracy] may disagree on religious creeds, we can agree on moral
and spiritual values." 9 Educators and philosophers have
shown300 that such universally accepted values as justice, prop-
erty rights, respect for law and authority, and brotherhood3°1 may
be derived from nonreligious sources 0 2 and may be enforced
294. E.g., Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 399 (1854). See also
Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 12 Allen 127 (Mass. 1866).
295. See, e.g., Taylor, Equal Protection of Religion: Today's Public
School Problem, 38 A.B.A.J. 277, 339 (1952). See also Hart v. School
Dist., 2 Lancaster L. Rev. 346, 352 (C.P. 1885).
296. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
297. Seminar No. 4, The Public School and Religious Education, 49
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 143, 144-45 (1954).
298. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMM'N, NATIONAL EDUCATION Ass'N,
MORAL .AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 17-30 (1951).
299. Id. at 33.
300. Id. at 37-45.
301. The public school teaches brotherhood as part of the democratic
ideal. The churches teach it as a response to God's commandment to love
one's neighbor. The secular humanist practices it as an expression of a
purely human value. Comm. on Religion and Public Education of the Na-
tional Council of the Churches of Christ, Relation of Religion to Public
Education-A Study Document, International J. of Religious Education,
Apr. 1960, pp. 21, 25.
302. "After all, if Aristotle, 350 years before the advent of Christianity,
could write a rather comprehensive and enduring work on ethics, I do not
see why it should be so difficult for modem American secularists of good
will to do likewise." Address by F. E. Flynn, Professor of Philosophy, Col-
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by nonreligious sanctions. 3 ' In fact, there is persuasive authority
for the view that moral values are better learned through concrete
examples during the school day than through lessons that preach
them. 04
Other generally recognized values, "in the sense that they
are common to all segments of our society, irrespective of re-
ligious faith or philosophic school," 315 are "responsibility, hones-
ty, temperance, and self-control."3 6 Thus, while the Illinois leg-
islature demands that "every public school teacher shall teach the
pupils honesty, kindness, justice and moral courage for the pur-
pose of lessening crime and raising the standard of good citizen-
ship,"3 ' it recognizes that this aim may be accomplished on a
neutral basis by making clear that the statute "shall not be con-
strued as requiring religious or sectarian teaching. '308 Similar-
ly, New York prescribes courses in "partriotism and citizenship,"
but implies that this goal may be attained by "instruction in the
history, meaning, significance and effect of the provisions of the
constitution of the United States, [and of the state of New York],
the amendments thereto, [and] the declaration of indepen-
dence."3"9 Surely it may. While teachers should educate their stu-
dents about the fact that most of our citizens believe that there are
various religious sources and sanctions for our moral values, 10
they can successfully instill commonly cherished values without en-
gaging in religious indoctrination.
Although one writer, in his intellectual struggle to validate
Bible reading, went so far as to concede that the machinations
lege of St. Thomas, to the West St. Paul Federation of Teachers, Sept. 20,
1962.
303. "[T]he [ancient] Greeks are an excellent illustration of a people
whose principles of conduct were independent of religious sanction ....
Buddhism is primarily, if not entirely, a system of ethics; one of conduct,
without the inducements of rewards and punishments characteristic of
Western religions." THAYER, THE ATTACK UPON THE AMERICAN SECULAR
SCHOOL 205-06 (1951). See also THAYER, THE CHALLENGE OF THE PRES-
ENT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION 14-16 (1958).
304. See EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 298, at
60-70; HARTFORD, MORAL VALUES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION passim (1958);
THAYER, THE ATTACK UPON THE AMERICAN SECULAR SCHOOL 212-18
(1951).
305. Id. at 210.
306. Ibid.
307. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 27-12 (1961).
308. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 27-16 (1961).
309. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 801.
310. See Nichols, Religion and Education in a Free Society in RELIGION
IN AMERICA 148, 157 (Cogley ed. 1958). Cf. Rosenfield, Separation of
Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. PITT. L. REV. 561, 577-78
(1961).
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of his proposal were "contrary to reason, '3 1' all others seem to
have recognized that there are some religious objections to every
version of the Bible.31 2 When it is read as part of a devotional
exercise, the activity must be fairly characterized as solely reli-
giousY3 While teachers no longer beat dissenting students,31'
the fact is that there is an inherent compulsion to participate,
and therefore, conscientious scruples are influenced and compro-
mised. The practice should be held to violate the establishment
clause.
2. Academic Study of Religion
One last area of discussion concerning the place of the Bible
in the public schools must be considered. The suggestion has fre-
quently been made that the Bible (and religion generally) is a
vital educational tool. If this means "that the highest duty of those
who are charged with the responsibility of training the young peo-
ple.., in the public schools is in teaching both by precept and
example that in the conflicts of life they should not forget
God,"1 5 then it must be rejected under any reasonable standard.
Aside from the fact that this is educationally unacceptable,316 the
Court has made clear that the establishment clause forbids govern-
mental indoctrination of religious beliefs and public school re-
ligious instruction.317 Under the proposed constitutional standard,
this effort to inculcate religious beliefs would unquestionably be a
solely religious activity likely to influence and compromise the
students' freedom of conscientious choice. However, it is totally
inaccurate to conclude, as many have done, that this rejection
"sanctions [the *public schools'] utilization for the purposes of
atheists."3 '' This would be correct only if the public schools were
311. Harpster, supra note 268, at 46.
312. E.g., Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 MICH.
L. REV. 829, 842 (1954); Note, 22 ALBANY L. REv. 156, 172 (1958).
313. See Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, -, 179 A.2d 698, 708
(1962) (dissenting opinion).
314. See Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. (o.s.) 417 (Mass.
Police Ct. 1859).
315. Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 681, 288 S.W.2d 718, 725 (1956).
See also Church v. Bullock, 100 S.W. 1025, 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907):
"It may be said that said exercises tended to teach that there was an Al-
mighty God; but this cannot be held objectionable . .. .
'316. American public education "disapproves indoctrination with ref-
erence to matters of belief." Comm. on Religion and Education, Am.
Council on Education, Religion in Public Education, 42 RELIGIOUS EDU-
CATION 129, 161 (1947).
317. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
318. Schmidt, Religious Liberty and the Supreme Court of the United
States, 17 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 185 (1948).
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either constitutionally permitted or forced to teach that there is
no God. Obviously, the first amendment forbids this just as much
as it forbids exhortations to the contrary. The result, therefore, is
one of true neutrality.
It is also error to deduce that this rejection demands "that the
child has a 'legal duty' to put all this time in on secular subjects,
none on religious subjects";319 that it results in "the compulsory
exclusion of any religious element and the consequent promotion
and advancement of atheism";2. that it "surrender[s] these
schools to the sectarianism of atheism or irreligion"; 21 that it
bans all study of God as connected with our principles of govern-
ment;32 2 or that it compels silence about the Bible, religion, and
God, thus impressing school children that these matters are in-
significant. 23 It can hardly be denied that "we are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"324 since
it is a matter of "common notoriety"32 that the great majority
of our citizens are religious in the sense that they do believe in
God.3 26 Although there is some dispute concerning the percen-
tage of our population that is affiliated with organized religious
groups, 27 the most recent government survey showed that less
than three percent of all persons over the age of 14 reported that
they had no religion whatever; 328 almost 95 percent of the popu-
lation considered themselves to be either Protestant, Roman Catho-
lic, or Jewish.3 29 Nor can it be denied that "acknowledgement
of a Supreme Being has . . been a part of our history. '3 0
319. Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 23,
36 (1949).
320. Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 184, 176 N.E.2d 579, 583 (1961)
(Burke, J., concurring opinion).
321. Luther A. Weigle, formerly Dean of Yale Divinity School, quoted
in PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 291 (1953).
322. Brief for Intervenors-Respondents, pp. 55-56, Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
323. Schmidt, supra note 318, at 187-88. See also PARSONS, WHICH
WAY, DEMOCRACY? 11 (1939).
324. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
325. Cf. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421, 426 (1960).
326. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 289, has acknowledged that "we
are a religious people even though our government is secular."
327. Pfeffer contends that the figure is only about 50%. Id. at 303.
This must be compared with the fact that the various religious bodies claim
church membership in 1960 of 64% of the total population. BUREAU OF
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 48 (83d ed. 1962).
328. Id. at 46.
329. Ibid. Query as to how many of these felt "compelled" to make
such a disclosure.
330. VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE
NEW YORK PRAYER CASE 4 (1962).
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While there is some dispute as to how religious the founding
fathers were,331 the heritage of this country, both in the past
and at present, is replete with examples of theistic and religious
influences too multitudinous to enumerate fully.=2
These being the facts, not only would it be virtually impossible,
as a practical matter, to obliterate all references to religion from
the public schools, but it would be educationally undesirable."s
But a public school program that seeks to prevent children from
growing up as religious illiterates may not be fairly characterized
as a solely religious activity. There is a distinct and weighty public
purpose in seeing that all school children comprehend the role
that religion has played in this country's evolution 34 and that
they have some understanding of the nature of the conscientious
beliefs possessed by most of our citizens. Under the proposed con-
stitutional . standard there would be no constitutional objec-
tion331 to an academic study in comparative religion3 6 or to
331. See Pfeffer, Church and State: Something Less Than Separation,
19 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1951).
332. A partial list might include the fact that the Declaration of In-
dependence refers to the Deity four times; that the constitutions of 49
states acknowledge the existence of God and many imply that the rights
and liberties of the people issue from God and express gratefulness there-
fore. See Brief for Respondents, pp. 44-54, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962). "In God We Trust" has been impressed on our coins since
1865. In 1956, Congress adopted these words as our national motto.
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address referred to God, as did the Mayflower Com-
pact of 1620 and Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments. Such national monuments as the Tomb of the Un-
known Soldier, the Washington Monument, and the Lincoln and Jefferson
Memorials all contain inscriptions mentioning the Deity. The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 stated that religion was necessary to good government.
All of our Presidents have asked for the protection or help of God on as-
suming office. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446-49 (1962) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
333. See the views expressed at a seminar of educators in Seminar No.
4, The Public School and Religious Education, 49 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
143, 144-45 (1954); Cosway & Toepfer, Religion and the Schools, 17
U. CiNC. L. REV. 117, 142 (1948). "An educated person cannot be relig-
iously illiterate." Comm. on Religion and Education, Am. Council on Ed-
ucation, supra note 316, at 160.
334. "A course in the history of California which did not describe the
early Catholic missions is unthinkable." 25 CAL. OPS. ATr'Y GEN. 325
(1955). This same report found prayers and Bible reading in the public
schools to be contrary to the first amendment.
335. But see text acompanying notes 347-48 infra.
336. Accord, e.g., PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 309. Suther-
land, Public Authority and Religious Education,-A -Brief Survey of Con-
stitutional and Legal Limits, 52 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 256 (1957); Vish-
ny, The Constitution and Religion in the Public Schools, 10 Decalogue J.
June-July 1960, pp. 4, 6. But see Rosenfield, Separation of Church and
State in the Public Schools, 22 U. PITT. L. REV. 561, 578 (1961).
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the study of the Bible as an artistic work. 37 The salient distinc-
tion is that this would be teaching objectively about religion and
the Bible and would not be religious indoctrination.
The academic study of religion may not take the form of teach-
ing "that religion is sacred"33 nor present religious dogma as
factual material.33 9 The only purpose for this approach is to
inculcate religious beliefs. Nor may daily devotional Bible read-
ing exercises with the privilege of nonparticipation be validated
merely by characterizing them as an "elective course in non-sectar-
ian Bible study."30 The difference between a devotional exercise
and an ordinary literature course that examines the Bible, attempt-
ing no indoctrination and therefore not exerting pressure on stu-
dents, is the difference between a solely religious program that is
likely to result in the influencing or compromising of students'
conscientious scruples and a secular act by government that is
within its power.
It is not easy to deny, at least where younger children are con-
cerned, that even an objectively presented academic examination
of the Bible, or of religion generally, will result in some indoctri-
nation.3 '1 But to concede that there is much truth in the conten-
tion that "the young mind cannot grasp the nebulous distinction
between the Bible as literature and the Bible as sectarian instruc-
tion' 311 is not automatically to invalidate a school board's good
faith attempt343 to educate students with "much useful informa-
tion about the religious faiths, the important part they have played
in establishing the moral and spiritual values of American life,
337. See Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 404 (E.D. Pa.
1959); 25 CAL. OPs. ATr'Y GEN. 325 (1955).
338. Such was the announced purpose of a program adopted, in the
name of academic study of religion, by the Denver school system for
"intergroup education." Herberg, Religion, Democracy, and Public Ed-
ucation, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 118, 136 (Cogley ed. 1958).
339. See Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 522, 523-24 (1960).
340. This was suggested in Creel, Is It Legal for the Public Schools of
Alabama to Provide an Elective Course in Non-Sectarian Bible Instruc-
tion?, 10 ALA. LAW. 86, 94 (1949).
341. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 311; Sutherland, supra note
336; Vishny, supra note 336.
342. Cosway & Toepfer, supra note 333, at 137.
343. The problem of dealing with an unconstitutional legislative "motive"
of this kind is a vexing one. See Emerson & Haber, supra note 339, at
524. However, it is far from insuperable. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). See generally Israel, On Charting A
Course Through The Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v.
Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV.107, 140 n.138 (1962).
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and their role in the story of mankind." ' No doubt, indoctrina-
tion often results from academic pursuits. Therefore, although the
wisdom of reserving this inquiry to the higher grades may be de-
cided by.local authorities, 5 it would not seem to be a proper
question for the Supreme Court.346
However, despite the fact that the activity is secular and thus
immunized from the proposed constitutional standard, it may still
be in violation of the establishment clause. The thesis suggested
is that when a secular activity by government results not only in
attainment of a civil objective, but also promotes religion, the es-
tablishment clause is violated if the civil goal may be accomplish-
ed just as well by means that do not promote religion. 7 Thus,
it may be argued that the establishment clause demands that the
objective study of religion or the Bible be confined to those higher
grades where the influencing or compromising of religious beliefs
would not occur because the audience is adult enough to disting-
uish between -indoctrination and academic discussion. 4 The con-
tention. would be quite convincing if it could be shown that, by
so doing, the state's secular objective of making students religious-
ly literate could be just as effectively achieved.
-The Roman Catholic church has voiced strong opposition to
allowing its children, at any age, to participate in academic cours-
es in religion. 49 It has also been observed that "the objective
teacting of religiqn is likely to be unacceptable to most church-
es., 350 In the, first analysis, this becomes only one factor to be
considered in-making-the legislative choice. If, however, some
religious sect demands that its members do not participate in this
instruction as a matter of religious dogma, the question becomes
344. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COM'N, NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL Ass'N,
MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 78 (1951).
345.
The unity of our own country, our understanding of the other nations
of the world, and respect for the rich religious traditions of all hu-
manity would be enhanced by instruction about religion in the public
schools. Like any other teaching in which deep personal emotions
are involved, such instruction should, of course, give due consideration
to the varying degrees of maturity of the students.
Id. at 78-79.
346. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961). See generally
Sutherland, Public Authority and Religious Education: A Brief Survey of
Constitutional and Legal Limits, in THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 67 (Brown ed. 1958).
347. See note 240 supra.
348. Cf. Kalven, A Commemorative Case Note, Scopes v. State, 27
U. CHI. L. REv. 505, 518 (1960). But cf. Comment, 32 MARQ. L. REv.
138, 144 (1948).
349. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 310.
350. Ibid.
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one of whether the free exercise clause is violated by compelling
attendance in these courses. Here, as elsewhere,351 a difficult
and delicate free exercise problem is raised when there is a direct
conflict between a religious tenet and action compelled by the
state-that is, when the state, in pursuit of a secular purpose
demands on pain of criminal prosecution that a person compro-
mise his religious scruples.352 The Supreme Court has not clear-
ly articulated any principle to govern these situations, 353 and the
issue is beyond the scope of this article.3 What should be made
plain, however, is that regardless of whether participation in
the program may be made mandatory under the free exercise
clause, the state is engaging in a secular activity when it introduces
the academic study of religion into the public schools. Therefore,
with one possible reservation,355 the establishment clause is not
in issue and religious objections to the activity may not result in
its abolition. 56
No doubt there are practical difficulties in administering a pro-
gram of teaching about religion. It may be argued that instructors,
who are themselves affiliated with a particular sect, cannot or will
not objectively present all points of view;357 the result, especially
351. See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
352. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
353. Cases presenting the problem are Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
354. The Court has stated that "legislative power... may reach people's
actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties
or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's
religion." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961) (dictum).
If this be the standard, the question of whether the state may demand a
religious dissenter to attend classes in the objective study of religion turns
on whether the Court feels that any student's failure to attend would be
"in violation of important social duties or subversive of good order."
On the other hand, the Court has also noted the importance of whether
the religious freedom asserted by the dissenter brings him "into collision
with rights asserted by any other individual." West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943). It is fairly plain that by
absenting themselves from classes engaged in studying about religion, the
objectors would not be directly affecting anyone else. Thus, it could be
argued that their free exercise claim should be upheld. However, in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Court upheld the
conviction of a Mormon polygamist who defended on the ground that the
tenets of his church demanded that he practice polygamy. Here it would
seem that the defendant's action affected only those persons who volun-
teered to be affected. For general discussion of this problem, see LOCK-
HART, KAMISAR & CHOPER. SUPPLEMENT TO DODD'S CASES ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 400-01 (1962).
355. See text accompanying notes 347-48 supra.
356. See text accompanying notes 117-25 supra.
357. See Margolin, Book Review, 72 YALE L.J. 212, 214 (1962).
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as far as the younger children are concerned, will be indoctrina-
tion at least as powerful as that obtained by a solely religious ac-
tivity. If the secular purposes of a program of the academic study
of religion were inherently subject to abuse, then the only remedy
might be to ban the activity.35 s But the alleged defect appears
not to be inherent. Educators have stated that "the public school
can teach objectively about religion without advocating or teach-
ing any religious creed. '359 Theologians "believe that the teach-
ers of the American public school system are, on the whole, quali-
fied to maintain free discussion with genuine respect for religious
perspectives."36 The remedy for teacher abuse is to enjoin it
or to get another teacher; it is not to outlaw the program.3 1
Another objection leveled at the academic study of religion in
the public schools is that since it is, by its nature, highly contro-
versial, it is likely to engender serious antagonisms among students
of the different religious faiths. Instances of this have been record-
ed.362 It has been suggested that this matter of "divisiveness"
should determine the constitutionality of governmental programs
in the religious area.36 3 This seems to be neither a desirable nor
workable approach to the problem. While this matter is unques-
tionably relevant to the legislative decision, once a genuinely sec-
ular-based program is enacted, it is difficult to see why it should
be threatened with preordained abolition under the establishment
clause either because some religious group finds it objection-
able or because the sensibilities of some students will be offend-
358. See Note, 52 COLuM. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1952); Note, 61
YALE L.J. 412-13 (1952).
359. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMM'N, NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL ASS'N,
MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 77 (1951).
That religious beliefs are controversial is not an adequate reason for
excluding teaching about religion from the public schools. Economic
and social questions are taught and studied in the schools on the very
sensible theory that students need to know the issues being faced and
to get practice in forming sound judgments. Teaching about religion
should be approached in the same spirit. General guides on the teach-
ing of all controversial issues may be helpful. If need be, teachers
should be provided with special help and information to equip them
to teach objectively in this area.
Id. at 78.360. Nichols, 'Religion and Education in a Free Society, in RELIGION
IN AMERICA 148, 159 (Cogley ed. 1958).
361. 'See Lieberman, A General Interpretation of Separation of Church
and State and Its Implications for Public Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE
EDUCATION 129, 134 (1956); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1952).
362. PFEFFER & BAUM, PUBLIC SCHOOL SECTARIANISM AND THE JEW-
ISH CHILD 34, 37 (1957).
363. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., con-
curring opinion). See note 188 supra.
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ed. If the governmental activity were a solely religious one that
would likely result in the influencing or compromising of religious
beliefs, the question should be answered differently, as has been
maintained throughout this article. But many secular educational
programs create dissention and discomfort among students. 4 If
the basis of this is due to religious conviction, the free exercise
clause may afford individual relief. 65
Some ardent religionists (and also, undoubtedly some avid non-
religionists) have advocated the exclusion of all religious matter
from the public school curriculum.16 This would mean, of course,
that the study of European history would ignore the Protestant
Reformation and the great religious controversies of the Middle
Ages; that American history would be devoid of the struggle for
religious freedom in the colonies; that art courses must exclude
Da Vinci's "Last Supper" and Michelangelo's "Moses"; and that
Beethoven's "Missa Solemnis" and Caruso's rendition of "Adeste
Fidelis" could not be played in a music class. This line of reason-
ing might even prohibit the Bible from the public school library.
Despite the fact that one state court recently could find no dif-
ference between studies of this nature and devotional Bible read-
ing,"67 the distinction is quite obvious. The inclusion of that re-
ligious material that is an intrinsic part of other disciplines is vital-
ly necessary to a well-rounded education and is, therefore, a sec-
ular act. 68 It is thus subject to the same constitutional analysis
as the objective study of religion. Unfortunately, from an educa-
tional standpoint, a recent study of American public education has
revealed a "more or less deliberate avoidance of religious subject
matter even when it was clearly intrinsic to the discipline con-
cerned."369 Unfortunately, from a constitutional standpoint, the
same study "found planned religious activities widely prevalent. 370
364. See note 359 supra.
365. See note 354 supra.
366. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 287; Johnson, Religion
and Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 143, 146 (1956).
367. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d
21, 32 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962). See also People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley,
81 Colo. 276, 290, 255 Pac. 610, 616 (1927).
368. See 25 CAL. OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 316, 325 (1955); Johnson, supra
note 366, at 145.
369. Johnson, Summary of Policies and Recommendations of the Amer-
ican Council on Education Committee on Religion and Education, in
THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 5,
9 (Brown ed. 1958).
370. Ibid.
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C. RELEASED TImE
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision on the Regents' prayer,
the Court had decided only two other cases on the merits that con-
cerned the question of religious penetration in the public schools.
Both of these cases involved released time programs.' Such a
program may be defined as "a system of religious education in
connection with the public school under which those children
desiring to participate in religious instruction are excused from
their secular studies for a specified period weekly, while those
children not participating in religious instruction remain under
the jurisdiction and supervision of the public school for the usual
period of secular instruction. No distinction is made in the use of
the term between religious instruction classes held within or
without the public school building; nor between classes held at the
first or last period of the school day and those held sometime
between these two periods." '
Under the proposed constitutional standard, all released time
plans should be held in violation of the establishment clause. The
only immediate purposes of such a program are to "encourage re-
ligious instruction '373 and to aid in the religious indoctrination
of school children. In upholding the constitutionality of these pro-
grams, neither the Supreme Court 7' nor the state appellate
courts 75 have denied this fact, nor have the many commentators
371. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex re/. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
- 372. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 315 (1953). For a gen-
eral history of the program, see id. at 313-27. Research has revealed one
"first-hour-of-the-day" released time program which was said to be volun-
tary. Nonetheless, "no pupil . . . has refused or failed to attend such
morning services for religious instruction." State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd,
217 Ind. 348, 359-60, 28 N.E.2d 256, 261-62 (1940).
373. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
374. Ibid.
375. Gordon v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 178 P.2d 488
"(Ct. App. 1947); People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 396 Ill. 14,
71 N.E.2d 161 (1947); People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Educ., 394
Ill. -228, 68 N.E.2d 305 (1946); Zorach v. Clauson, 278 App. Div. 573,
-102 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1951), affd, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.2d 463 (1951);
People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 219 App. Div. 233, 219 N.Y. Supp. 189
(1927), affd, 245 N.Y. 195, 156 .N.E. 663 (1927); Perry v. School
Dist. N6. 81, 54 Wash. 2d 886, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959). Examination of
those reported state trial court opinions that have sustained released time
programs also bears out this contention. Zorach v. Clauson, 198 Misc. 631,
99 N.Y.S.2d 339. (Sup. Ct. 1950); Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 85
N.Y.S.2d 682'(Sup. Ct. 1948); Lewfs v. Graves, 127 Misc. 135, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 632 (Sup. Ct. 1926). Research reveals only one reported state case
s"tiking down a released time program. The grounds for the decision were
that -(1) _sinee report cards were printed during school hours upon school
presses, the state constitutional provision barring state aid to denomination-
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who have defended these decisions. That a system of released
time is inherently coercive, thereby compromising the students'
freedom of religious choice, has already been mentioned and some-
what demonstrated above.37 6 Further evidence of its influencing
and compromising nature is not lacking. The existence of compul-
sion has been found in the fact that religious leaders have so stren-
uously pressed for the establishment of released time systems. 7
While this is not necessarily valid when measured by the strict rules
of logic,3 75 it is nonetheless quite persuasive. Religious educators
who are proponents of the system have noted that released time
programs have a "remarkable evangelistic record,"371 for in those
schools where they operate, a substantial percentage of students
attend religious classes who would not otherwise do so. 380 Re-
ligious leaders who oppose released time view it as "a means of ap-
plying public pressures to non-conformists so as to make them
'give in.' "381 Schools with released time programs have reported
"a considerable percentage of pupils in attendance whose parents
do not belong to any church. s3 2 "They want to go to the church
with their schoolmates and ask their parents to sign release
cards. '383 Where released time systems have been abandoned, at-
tendance at religious classes has declined." 4 Children of minority
religious faiths have been known to enroll in the majority's re-
ligious classes because they did "not wish to be marked. '38 5 The
al schools was violated and (2) the program violated the state education
law's provision requiring public school attendance during the entire time
of the school session. Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y. Supp.
822 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
376. See text accompanying notes 102-04, 148 supra.
377. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 373; Cushman, The Holy
Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 497 (1955).
378. Religious leaders may have any one of a multitude of reasons
for seeking the establishment of the released time system, and even if
their reason is that they believe the system is compulsive, that does not
in fact make it true.
379. Dr. Erwin L. Shaver of the International Council of Religious
Education, quoted in PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 328.
380. Ibid. Dr. Shaver points out that before a released time system,
half of the school population receives no religious training; when the
system is instituted, an average of one-third of this neglected half is
reached.
381. Glenn Archer, Executive Director of Protestants and Other Amer-
icans United, quoted in PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 332.
382. JACKSON & MALMBERG, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE STATE
39 (1928).
383. Sullivan, Religious Education in the Schools, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 92, 94 (1949).
384. See id. at 111.
385. PFEFFER & BAUM, PUBLIC SCHOOL SECTARIANISM AND THE JEW-
ISH CHILD 19 (1957). See Record, p. 135, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
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fact that some may not have done so in no way refutes the ex-
istence of the inherent pressure.8 6 Those who chose not to en-
roll, or who were forbidden by their parents from doing so, have
told of being "ostracized by the other children in after-school ac-
tivities. '3 s8
Examination of the reasoning utilized by those few who de-
fend the constitutionality of released time by denying the presence
of coercion is revealing. The Illinois Supreme Court, in McCoIlum,
"proved" the nonexistence of any coercion by (1) saying that it
was no more present there than it was in a prior, similar case, and
(2) referring to some testimony by Terry's mother. ss The first
reason, of course, merely avoids the issue, and aside from the fact
that the quoted testimony failed to support the court's conten-
tion," 9 there was overwhelming evidence to the contrary.'"
Father Murray has taken the position that no threat to any per-
sonal rights was visible in McCollum,9' Terry was not pressured
into doing anything he did not want to do.392 However, he then
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), in which Terry McCollum's
teacher testified that she spoke to Terry's mother about "the fact that
allowing him to take the religious education course might help him to
become a member of the group. He was not accepted as a member of
our class. I thought if he did the same things that they were doing that
might help."
386. The argument that this disproves the existence of coercion was
made by Chief Judge Desmond, concurring in Zorach v. Clauson, 303
N.Y. 161, 176, 100 N.E.2d 463, 470 (1951).
387. Affidavit quoted in PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 357.
When the released time students departed . . . I felt left behind.
The released children made remarks about my being Jewish and I
was made very much aware of the fact that I did not participate with
them in the released time program. I endured a great deal of anguish
as a result of this and decided that I would like to go along with
the other children to the church center rather than continue to expose
myself to such harassment. I asked my mother for permission to par-
ticipate in the released time program and to accompany my Catholic
classmates to their religious center, but she forbade it.
Id. at 356; accord, id. at 356-67. Contra, Corcoran, Social Relationships
of Elementary School Children and the Released-Time Religious Edu-
cation Program (unpublished doctorial dissertation in Stanford Uni-
versity Library), abstracted in 56 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 363-64 (1961),
concluding that the "degree of participation in the released-time program was
not demonstrably related to the sociometric status of elementary school chil-
dren."
388. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 396 III. 14, 23, 71
N.E.2d 161, 165 (1947).
389. Mrs. McCollum had testified that, "I do not know it [released
time] would bother him [Terry] one way or the other. I did not know it
until in court." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
390. See, e.g., notes 103, 385 supra.
391. Murray, Lav or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 23,
24 n.7 (1949).
392. Id. at 39.
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recognizes that there was "pressure by the school system in the
interest of religious sects," '93 but justifies its existence by stating
that the public schools' "sheer omission of religion from the cur-
riculum is itself a pressure against religion," '394 and that "the
system as such has become a formidable ally of secularism."39
This position may be refuted simply by denying the premises. As
has been pointed out, the establishment clause does not demand
that the public schools omit religion from their curriculum, nor
does it forbid them from objectively educating children as to the
important role religion plays and has played in our civilization
and in others. And so long as the establishment clause forbids
the indoctrination of pupils with the ideas that there is no God or
that, if there is, His influence is unimportant, 96 the public schools
may not fairly be said to be allied with secularism.
While the Supreme Court did find the McCollum released
time system in violation of the establishment clause, it sustained
the program at issue in Zorach v. Clauson. 3" The only signif-
icant difference between the cases, so recognized by the Court
majority,393 was that in McCollum the public school classrooms
were used for religious instruction, whereas in Zorach the reli-
gious classes were held away from the public school premises. It
has already been shown that these cases cannot be meaning-
fully distinguished on the basis of the use of public property. 9
It may be true that "if the location of the school building makes
the trip to a church long or hazardous because of dangerous street
crossings, attendance will be improved by securing permission to
teach in the school building."400 But the fact that the system in
McCollum may have more effectively promoted religious educa-
tion does not mean that the Zorach plan did not promote it at all.
It could be argued that the holding of the religious sessions in
the same classrooms in which the ordinary daily school activities
took place suggested that the religious instruction was an integral
part of the public school program and, therefore, created a greater
compulsive pressure on dissenters. This may make the result in
McCollum more understandable, but it does not erase the "in-
eradicable built-in pressure to 'sign-up' for religious instruction ' 40'
393. Ibid.
394. Ibid.
395. Ibid.
396. See text accompanying note 318 supra.
397. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
398. Id. at 315.
399. See text accompanying notes 129-47 supra.
400. Sullivan, supra note 383, at 94.
401. Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools,
22 U. Prrr. L. REV. 561, 574 (1961).
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in Zorach. Even those who favor the result in Zorach'0 2 agree
with those who do no 03 that the decisions are irreconcilable on
the matter of inherent coercion.
Probably the most frequently voiced argument in support of the
constitutionality of released time is that its validity is dictated by
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters." 4 That case held an Oregon statute requiring public
school attendance for children of certain ages unconstitutional on
the ground that the fourteenth amendment gives parents the right
to direct the education of their children and, therefore, the right
to send their children to private or parochial schools that meet
state qualifications. One aspect of the argument is that the right
recognized in Pierce was a right guaranteed by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment; to deny the availability of religious
instruction in the public schools to those parents who, for financial
or other reasons, send their children there, is to confine this right
"to parents who can afford to send their children to parochial or
other private schools ... ."115 The contention that rights pro-
tected by the free exercise clause would be suppressed by forbid-
ding released time and other religious programs in the public
schools has also been made by a number of others without the aid
of the Pierce case.406
Apart from the question of whether Pierce really upheld a free
exercise claim, 407 the argument must fail. The shortest answer is
that released time programs violate the establishment clause and
that ends the matter. Although this point seemingly begs the ques-
tion, it is strengthened by the fact that the two most articulate pro-
ponents of the free exercise argument recognize that the validity of
their argument turns on whether the continued operation of re-
402. E.g., Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 MICH.
L. REV. 829, 839 (1954).
403. E.g.,.Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 187-88, 100 N.E.2d 463,
477 (1951) (Fuld, J., dissenting); Kurland, Of Church and State and
the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHm. L. REV. 1, 77 (1961); Comment, 7 ALA.
L. REv. 99; 107 (1954); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1038-39 (1952);
Note, 61 YALE L. 405, 413-16 (1952); 74 HARV. L. REv. 611, 614
(1961); 31 TExAS L. REV. 327, 329-30 (1953).
404. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
405. Corwin, The Supreme Court As National School Board, 14 LAw
& CONTEMW. PROB. 3, 20 (1949).
406. E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 178, 100 N.E.2d 463,
471(1951) (Desmond, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 198 Misc.
631, 636-37, 99 N.Y.S.2d 339, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Harpster, Religion,
Education and the Law, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 24, 53 (1952); Murray, supra
note 391, at 33; Reed, Church-State and the Zorach Case, 27 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 529, 540 (1952)'.
407. See-Kurland; supra note 403, at 13-14; Pfeffer, Released Time
and Religious Liberty: A Reply, 53 MICH. L. REV. 91, 93-94 (1954).
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leased time programs infringes on the rights of anyone else.4"8
While it has not been contended that the program's imposition on
nonconformists violates their rights specifically guaranteed by the
free exercise clause,4" 9 it has been amply shown that the system
of released time does infringe on their conscientious scruples.
The more authoritative answer to the argument based on Pierce
is that the Court has specifically rejected a similar free exercise
contention. If the free exercise clause is not violated by a law
that "simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appel-
lants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious be-
liefs more expensive, '  a decision by the Court to uphold the
establishment clause surely must not fail because it has this ef-
fect.41 It may be true that the rights guaranteed by Pierce
would forbid a state from so regulating its public school system
''as to make religious education or exercise impracticable or to
limit such education or exercise to Saturday or Sunday" '412 and
would preclude a state from "the pre-empting of the whole of the
child's time so as to leave no adequate part for religion." '413 Such
regulation would effectively bar action "demanded by one's reli-
gion."414 But, since no religion demands that its children be ex-
cused early from school to attend religious classes, the abolition of
released time "does not make unlawful any religious practices
. . )M15 At most, the denial of a released time program may
be said to impose "only an indirect burden on the exercise of re-
ligion ... " 6 Clearly, neither the purpose nor the effect of the
denial of a released time program "is to impede the observance of
408. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 178, 100 N.E.2d 463, 471
(1951) (Desmond, J., concurring); Corwin, note 405 supra. See also
Johnson, Summary of Policies and Recommendations of the American
Council on Education Committee on Religion and Education, in THE
STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 5, 16-17
(Brown ed. 1958).
409. But see Pfeffer, supra note 407, at 96-97. See also I BAYLOR L.
REV. 79, 81 (1948).
410. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
411. To adopt this free exercise rationale, see text accompanying note
405 supra, would be tantamount to saying that the free exercise rights
of indigent Roman Catholics would be denied by the state's failure to
provide free parochial schools.
412. Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 73, 84-85 (1949).
413. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 289.
414. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961). Even here, the
Court has stated that this is not an absolute test for determining free
exercise clause violations. 366 U.S. at 605. See text accompanying notes
351-52 supra.
415. 366 U.S. at 605. See also Pfeffer, supra note 407, at 96.
416. 366 U.S. at 606. See also Note, 61 YALE L.J. 410-11 (1952).
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one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between re-
ligions . .. ." If it were, the free exercise clause might be violat-
ed. 17 Rather, the purpose and effect is to prevent a violation
of the establishment clause.1 s Since this "nonreligious" purpose
would plainly be thwarted by any program of released time, under
the standards set forth by the Supreme Court,"9 there is no cre-
dence to the contention that any person's free exercise rights are
denied by the exclusion of released time programs.4-
Another aspect of the argument based on Pierce deals with the
matter of compulsion. The rationale articulated by the Court
in striking down the program in McCollum was that "the operation
of the State's compulsory education system . . . assists and is in-
tegrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by
separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school
for secular education are released in part from their legal duty
upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This is
beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-
supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread
their faith."'" The Court concluded that, by the system, "the
State . . . affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it
helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of
the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separa-
tion of Church and State."'4" The argument advanced is that if
the McCollum plan was defective because it conditioned absence
from the public school upon attendance at religious classes, then,
a fortiori, the parochial school attendance upheld in Pierce is also
constitutionally defective for precisely the same reason, for it per-
mits children to satisfy the compulsory school attendance law by
attending religious classes. 423 Both arrangements produce attend-
417. See 366 U.S. at 607.
418. Cf. 366 U.S. at 609.
419. If the nonreligious purpose (preventing an establishment clause
violation) could be accomplished by means that do not impose an indirect
burden on religious observance (exclusion of released time programs may
be said to impose such a burden, see text accompanying note 416 supra),
the Court has indicated that failure to employ the alternative means would
violate the free exercise clause. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
(1961).
420. Accord, Kauper, supra note 402, at 848.
421. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-
10 (1948).
422. 333 U.S. at 212.
423. See Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 173-74, 100 N.E.2d 463,
468-69 (1951); Corwin, supra note 405, at 20; Meiklejohn, Educational
Cooperation Between Church and State, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 61,
67-68 (1949); Sullivan, supra note 383, at 109; 22 So. CAL. L. REv. 423,
440 (1949).
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ance at religious classes by discharging parents from their obliga-
tion under the compulsory school provisions. "It is not merely fanci-
ful or frivolous to suggest that [Pierce] ... represents one hundred
percent released time."4 4
This line of argument is not wholly unpersuasive. If McCollum
were based on nothing more than the compulsory education law,
it would seem to jeopardize Pierce. Or if the main thrust of Mc-
Collum were that truancy regulations were enforced by reports of
attendance at religious classes being made to the public school'
and that "knowledge that an official record is kept of his attend-
ance necessarily places pressure on the child-accustomed as he
is to the discipline of school-to attend these religious classes,"42
then again the system upheld in Pierce might seem to be faulty.
But, even accepting the validity of these bases, the situations are
distinguishable. Under the system of released time, the only al-
ternative to remaining in the public school is to attend religious
classes. This is not the case in the Pierce context. There, children
who were excused from public school attendance had a broader
range of alternatives; they could attend any accredited private
school as well as parochial school."z A true analogy between
released time and the situation in Pierce would exist only if re-
ligious classes were but one of several desirable choices available
to students. 2 A school board program that would permit stu-
dents to be released for a certain period of time each week on con-
dition that they attend one of a group of extra-curricular education
classes-for example, classes in music, art, religion, drama 42-
might well be valid under the establishment clause.43 Indeed,
the reasoning of one noted commentator suggests that the exclu-
424. Kauper, supra note 402, at 841.
425. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
209 n.5 (1948).
426. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 188, 100 N.E.2d 463, 477 (1951)
(dissenting opinion).
427. The case itself was prosecuted by both a parochial school and a
military training school.
428. Here, again, the question of legislative motive becomes relevant.
See note 343 supra.
429. "Released time as now practiced had its origin in Gary, Indiana,
in 1913 when the Superintendent of Schools directed the dismissal of
children an hour earlier one day of each week to enable them to pursue
their individual interests such as religion, music or art." Pfeffer, Religion,
Education and the Constitution, 8 LAW. GUILD REV. 387, 396-97 (1948).
430. The New York courts have upheld released time programs on
this basis. People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 219 App. Div. 233, 239, 219
N.Y. Supp. 189, 195-96, afj'd, 245 N.Y. 195, 198, 156 N.E. 663, 664
(1927). See also Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 475, 494 (1955).
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sion of religious education as one of the alternatives would violate
constitutionally protected religious freedom.43' Most important-
ly in regard to the proposed constitutional standard, the difference
that might make this program valid is that the provision of at-
tractive alternatives to religious education would remove the in-
herently coercive element in released time. Students who were re-
ligious nonconformists and students with marginal beliefs would
not be faced with the choice of either receiving religious instruction,
which would compromise or influence their conscientious scruples,
or being regarded as "oddballs. ' 32 They could join with those
of their friends of the religious majority who preferred to study
art, music, or drama rather than religion.' It may be that by
instituting such a program, more children would attend religious
classes than would be the case otherwise. This is undoubtedly the
result of the decision in Pierce.434 But, despite the fact that
this represents aid to religion, the absence of coercion calls for a
favorable constitutional judgment under the proposed constitution-
al standard. State action of this nature may be fairly characterized
as merely an "accommodation. ''43
However, there is a more compelling distinction between the
Pierce situation and released time, again based on compulsion.
Regardless of the presence of alternative choices, no child of a
minority religious faith (or of no faith at all) feels compelled
to attend a parochial school simply because, under the Pierce case,
the government must permit him to do so. But, in the released
time situation, nonconforming pupils do feel compelled to accept
religious instruction, thus compromising their conscientious be-
liefs.436 This last argument has been rejected on the ground that
431. Kurland, supra note 403, at 5.
432. Those children of minority religious faiths who choose to go
home to receive religious instruction from their parents, a plan suggested
by the counsel for the school board in Zorach, would be just as "odd-
ballish" as those who were forced to remain in school because their
parents had no religion to impart to them. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra
note 372, at 355.
433. In light of the fact that only about half of the public school popu-
lation would accept religious education without a program of released
time, see note 380 supra, if attractive alternatives to religious education
were available to released students, it is most likely that many religious
conformists would accompany the dissenters to the nonreligious classes.
434. It is obvious that if the Court had upheld the statute in Pierce,
parochial school attendance would be diminished.
435. See text accompanying notes 463-72 infra.
436. It might be argued that by the Supreme Court's action in Pierce,
removing any legal impediment to full time parochial education, the
clergy was left free to exert strenuous pressures on their parishioners to
send their children to parochial schools and that, in this way, govern-
mental action resulted in private pressures being brought to bear on those
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it "is based on the premise that the public school represents a
kind of involuntary imprisonment, release from which may be ef-
fected by attending religious education classes," '437 and that it
may not "be accepted as an unquestioned proposition of fact that
religious instruction is so attractive and public school education
so repressive that parents and children will invariably respond by
choosing to escape the public school classroom."438 This is not
the premise advanced here. The inherent compulsion does not
necessarily arise from the unattractiveness of the public school, but
from the urge of the nonconforming students, who would other-
wise be left behind, to join the group. Thus, released time is a
solely religious activity that is likely to result in compromising
and influencing religious beliefs.
Of course, if it could be shown that in those schools that have
adopted released time439 there is majority nonparticipation, it
would be difficult to maintain that those students who remain be-
hind will be considered "oddballs" by their colleagues. As a practi-
cal matter, it would seem that unless a large proportion of the
school were "willing" to participate, the program would be
discontinued.4" For the most part, the available statistics bear
out the assumption that most children attend.44' Those involved in
the program have stated that "the enrollment of 90 to 99 per-
cent of the public school constituency in the weekday church school
is quite common. To reach less than 80 percent is the excep-
members of the faith with marginal convictions, thus influencing the free-
dom of religious participation; this then would be no different than that
aspect of released time. This argument may be rebutted by pointing out that
the Pierce decision was dictated by a serious free exercise claim: since the
Roman Catholic religion demands that its children attend parochial schools,
the Oregon statute was in direct conflict with the religious practice. See
text accompanying notes 479-81 infra. It has already been pointed out that
denial of released time presents no comparable free exercise claim. See
generally text accompanying notes 410-20 supra. Thus, although released
time must be characterized as a so!ely religious activity, the purpose of
the decision in Pierce may be fairly characterized as "nonreligious."
437. Kauper, supra note 402, at 839.
438. Ibid.
439. A recent survey indicates that about 30% of American public
schools have released time programs. Dierenfield, The Extent of Religious
Influence in American Public Schools, 56 RELIGIous EDUCATION 173,
177 (1961).
440. In fact, this often happens. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372,
at 336-37.
441. There appear to be no published national statistics on the percent-
age of participation in those schools that do have released time programs.
See generally id. at 317-21.
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tion."'' - Reports from such cities as Spokane, Washington, 4-3
Champaign, fllinois, 4" Salina, Kansas, 45  and Van Wert,
Ohio," 6 confirm this. On the other hand, some schools in Berke-
ley, California,' 7 Mount Vernon, New York,"8 Minneapolis, 4 9
and Chicago4 50 report minority participation. Released time
should nonetheless be invalid in most of those schools with minor-
ity participation because of the consequences of the unpleasant at-
mosphere that exists for those pupils, many of them members of
the religious majorities, who remain. Educators have complained
that one of the major problems involved in the administration of
released time programs is what to do with the nonparticipants.45
The dilemma facing them is that if special programs or nor-
mal educational activities are conducted, this in effect penalizes
those who attend religious classes; on the other hand, it is un-
fair to the nonparticipants "to keep them occupied solely with
'busy' work."452 If the latter course is taken, an unattractive en-
vironment is produced for those left behind, thereby influencing
attendance at religious classes. Furthermore, if regular school
courses are continued, although the religious school may be intrin-
sically no more attractive than the public school, it is likely that
the mere- opportunity to change environment and "escape from
the classroom and school routine ' '4m will act as an incentive to
students to go elsewhere. These being the less attractive alternatives
available in the public schools, the solely religious program of re-
leased time will likely influence the student with marginal re-
442. Dr. W. Dyer Blair, Director of the Department of Weekday
Religious Education of the International Council of Religious Education,
in 1940, quoted in id. at 335.
443. "In most instances . . . there are but few children remaining."
Perry v. School Dist. No. 81, 54 Wash. 2d 886, 889, 344 P.2d 1036, 1038
(1959).
444. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
445. 95%. JACKSON & MALMBERG, op. cit. supra note 382, at 50.
446. 81-96%. Ibid.
447. Just over 25%. See Nelson, The Fourth "R" -Religion-In Edu-
cation, 51 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 40, 41 (1956).
448. Over 25%. See Larson, A Superintendent Looks at the Week-day
School of Religion, 51 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 43 (1956).
449. Overall, about 50%. But individual schools vary from 12 to 94%.
A majority of them are above 50%. Greater Minneapolis Council of
Churches, Comparison of Weekday Church School Enrollment with Pub-
lic School Enrollment, Nov. 13-17, 1961.
450. Less than 10%. See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
348 (1953).
451. See Nelson, supra note 447, at 41.
452. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 450, at 325.
453. Note, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 1033, 1038 (1952). See also Cushman,
supra note 430, at 496.
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ligious beliefs to attend religious classes-something he would not
otherwise do.
The same cannot be said for a program of dismissed time,
"the system under which, on one or more days, the public school
is closed earlier [or opened later]'15 than usual, and all chil-
dren are dismissed, with the expectation-but not the requirement
-that some will use the dismissed period for participation in re-
ligious instruction. 455 It is no surprise, therefore, that there is
general agreement, even among those who find released time un-
constitutional, that dismissed time is valid.456 True, such a pro-
gram will probably result in greater attendance at religious class-
es than would otherwise occur.457 Moreover, it might be demon-
strated that the school board's purpose in early closing was solely
religious. 58 Nevertheless, the element of state-caused compul-
sion is absent. Students are not faced with the publicly imposed
choice of either going to religious school or remaining behind in
an unenticing setting. If they choose to attend religious classes,
they will do so in preference to other equally alluring, and, in
many cases, more than equally alluring, alternatives.4 5 Perhaps
dissenters will nonetheless be subject to pressures from their con-
forming colleagues who choose to attend religious classes, 460 but
this would exist even if the schools closed at the regular hour. Un-
like the case of released time, the coercion may not be attributed
to governmental action. 46' The argument has been made that a
454. See City of New Haven v. Town of Torrington, 132 Conn. 194,
197, 43 A.2d 455, 457 (1945).
455. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 450, at 315.
456. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 190, 100 N.E.2d 463, 478
(1951) (Fuld, J., dissenting); Cushman, Public Support of Religious Edu-
cation in American Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REV. 333, 354, 356
(1950); Sullivan, Religious Education in the Schools, 14 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 92, 93 (1949); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1952);
Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 374, 386 (1948); 46 MIcn. L. REv. 828,
829-30 (1948); 27 TEXAS L. REV. 256, 259 (1948); Note, 57 YALE L.J.
1114,1119 (1948).
457. See Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L.
REV. 426, 439 (1953).
458. A decision to hold the school picnic on Sunday afternoon, so as
to enable those students who wish to go to church to do so, seems to
have a solely religious purpose. But since this action does not inherently
compel church attendance, it could not be said to violate the establishment
clause under the proposed standard.
459. "[R]eligion can compete more successfully with arithmetic than
with recreation." Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1114, 1119 (1948).
460. See generally 31 TEXAS L. REV. 329 (1953).
461. Query if the same could be said if the public school rented its
premises for religious classes to commence immediately following the
end of the public school day. Would not the coercive pressures here be
attributable to the school board's action? See note 137 supra.
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dismissed time plan "could not be used if the effect of the dismis-
sal were to make the total time in school less than that required
as compulsory attendance. 141 2 This would be irrelevant under the
proposed consitutional standard because it has no bearing on
the matter of compulsion. In any case, it is difficult to determine
what merit the argument has since the required time for school
attendance could easily be reduced.
There has been much discussion, particularly with reference to
released time and other religious infiltration in the public schools,
about the state's assuming a role of "neutrality" in this conflict and
about the state's making an "accommodation" between the compet-
ing interests. 63 While this may have an abstract appeal, it does
not adequately substitute for analysis under a principled stand-
ard.4" The New York courts have upheld the constitutionality of
the Regents' prayer 65 and released time4 66 on this basis. Profes-
sor Kauper, a most articulate advocate for the constitutional valid-
ity of released time, agrees that it aids religion, but justifies it as a
"reasonable accommodation."46" It is true that "in matters of
public education due respect for the democratic process should
462. Cosway & Toepfer, Religion and the Schools, 17 U. CINC. L. REV.
117, 141 (1948).
463. See, e.g., 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 495, 501 & n.30 (1962) and au-
thorities cited therein.
464. Professor Robert F. Cushman calls for "a doctrine of state neutrali-
ty." Cushman, supra note 430, at 490. He argues that "if all social groups,
without regard to purpose, were allowed to come into the schools and
conduct meetings which the students could attend, religious groups, since
they are social groups, would be included." Perhaps so. But under this
same principle, it would be valid for the Community Sandlot Baseball
League, the Model Railroad Club (two of Cushman's examples, id. at 491),
and the Roman Catholic Church (my example) to come into the public
schools to prosyletize for members. Professor Philip Kurland's "neutral
principle of equality" would appear to call for the same result. Kurland, Of
Church and. State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5(1961). Under the principle proposed in this article, the establishment
clause would forbid the inclusion of the Church. There is nothing in the
Constitution prohibiting the use of the public schools for Little League
proselyting,_ the first amendment stands in the way of any religion doing
the same thing. Nor would the prohibition violate the free exercise clause
under any Supreme Court interpretation of it. At most, this would be
"only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion." Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). See generally text accompanying notes 415-
20 supra.1 465. -Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 694, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 491
(Sup. CL :1959).
466. Lewis V. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 73, 85 N.Y.S.2d 682, 690
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
467. Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 829, 841 (1954). See also Kauper, Released Time and Religious
Liberty:A Further-Reply, 53 MICH. L. REV. 233, 236 (1954).
1963]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
permit some discretion to the community in shaping its educational
policies,"46' and that "the interest of parents in the religious
education of their children is a legitimate legislative concern."46
Dismissed time satisfies these appeals. Professor Kauper agrees
that "no actual pressure [should be] placed on any student to at-
tend classes in religious education."47 But he states that "a prop-
er sense of concern for the non-participant does not require rejec-
tion of the [released time] program on constitutional grounds,"4 7
since "it remains to be demonstrated that the optional released
time privilege deprives anyone of [religious liberty]. 471 Hopeful-
ly, it has been demonstrated here.
1. Excusing Children for Religious Holidays
The argument has often been advanced 7 3 that excusing child-
ren from the public schools for observance of their particular re-
ligious holidays is merely an "instance of released time but on a
smaller scale, '474 and, therefore, this practice stands or falls with
released time. But there are many distinguishing features. Releas-
ed time is inherently coercive because it operates to single out the
nonconformists against their will and compels them to attend re-
ligious classes against their will. When children are excused from
classes on religious holidays, they ask to be singled out because
they wish to attend religious services. Assuming that the public
school act of excusing them has a solely religious purpose, the act
is requested by the religious nonconformists themselves.
In the case of released time, majority participation works to
coerce minority attendance. Minority participation usually results
in the practice of excusing children for religious holidays since the
public schools ordinarily close on the majority's religious holi-
days. 475 However, for the same reasons that operated in the re-
468. Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, supra note 467,
at 839.
469. Kauper, Released Time and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply,
supra note 467, at 236.
470. Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, supra note 467,
at 842.
471. Ibid.
472. Kauper, Released Time and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply,
supra note 467, at 236. See also Katz, supra note 457, at 439.
473. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); Zorach v. Clauson,
303 N.Y. 161, 173, 100 N.E.2d 463, 468 (1951); 20 FORDHAM L.
REV. 328, 331 (1951); Brief for Intervenors-Respondents, p. 43, Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
474. Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, supra note 467,
at 840.
475. Professor Kurland would probably also distinguish these situations,
but on other grounds. Since released time makes only religious education
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leased time context, it may be that permitting children of religious
minorities to be excused from the public school to attend religious
services will likely influence students of these religious minorities
with marginal beliefs to attend the church or synagogue of their
faith.476 Nonetheless, the situations are distinguishable because,
while it has been shown that there is no colorable claim that denial
of released time infringes on rights under the free exercise
clause,477 denying children of minority religious faiths their wish
to attend holiday religious services does raise a serious free ex-
ercise question.7 Even those who have argued that the two sit-
uations are otherwise similar recognize this difference. 79 At-
tendance at religious services is often an act demanded by one's
religion. By the public schools' refusal to permit such attendance,
the student faces the choice of either violating his religious princi-
ples or receiving whatever penalties the school chooses to impose.
The Supreme Court has not held that, in a situation of this nature,
the free exercise claim must prevail, but it has recognized that "in
such cases, to make accommodation between the religious action
and an exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task."'4
The free exercise claim here does appear to be quite substantial
and persuasive because it can hardly be said that a student's ac-
tion in absenting himself from school for one day is "in violation
of important social duties or subversive of good order.'' 4 81 For
available, he would likely find it invalid because "it is . . . forbidden the
state to confer favors [only] upon religious activity." Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 5 (1961). Since
pupils may be excused from the public schools for many reasons (e.g.,
funerals, dental appointments), he would likely say that the first amend-
ment demands that they also be excused for religious holidays because
"inhibitions [may] not be placed by the state on [only] religious activity."
Ibid. However, it would seem that if the public school forbade absence
for all extracurricular activities, Professor Kurland's thesis not only
would permit the schools to deny excusing children for religious obser-
vances, but would actually forbid the schools from granting it. Since
there is a substantial and persuasive, albeit not conclusive, free exercise
argument for granting children absence from the public schools to observe
their religious holidays, see text accompanying notes 478-81 infra, one
might well disagree with this last point See LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOP-
ER, SUPPLEMENT TO DODD'S CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAV 399 (1962).
476. Of course, if there is majority participation, inherent coercion
will exist.
477. See text accompanying notes 414-20 supra.
478. See Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 191-92, 100 N.E.2d 463,
479 (1951) (Fuld, J., dissenting); Cosway & Toepfer, Religion and the
Schools, 17 U. CINc. L. REv. 117, 141 (1948).
479. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 173, 100 N.E.2d 463, 468
(1951); Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, supra note 467,
at 840, 848.
480. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
481. 366 U.S. at 603.
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these reasons, the establishment clause may well permit a state
to excuse children from school for religious observances despite
the influence it may have on them and other pupils. No comparable
"nonreligious" justification exists for released time.4 "
2. Shared Time
The newly adopted program of "shared time,"' 3 under which
parochial school students come to the public schools each day to
take certain secular classes, merits brief consideration. As present-
ly constituted, the plan involves a relatively small number of Catho-
lic students" 4 joining their public school associates for a few hours
each day. There would seem to be no constitutional objection un-
der the proposed constitutional standard in these circumstances,
since the activity may not be characterized as being solely reli-
gious and it is unlikely that public school students will feel com-
pelled to join their Catholic colleagues when the latter return to
the parochial school.4 s5
One might suggest that, since the experience over the years with
released time has revealed teachers' persistent application of direct
pressures on pupils to attend religious classes, despite the fact that
teachers have been specifically prohibited from so doing,"" the
program is inherently subject to abuse and, therefore, unconstitu-
tional.4" ' However, we need not go this far. Despite the warning
that "the critical constitutional issues with respect to released time
cannot be solved by any play of language in using the word 'com-
pulsion,' "4s it is submitted that this solely religious activity should
fail, principally for that reason.
D. TEACHERS WEARING RELIGIOUS GARB
Next to Bible reading, the issue involving religious infusion in
the public schools probably most often brought before the state
courts is whether the schools may employ teachers who wear re-
ligious garb.4" 9 The reason commonly given for the invalidity of
482. Cf. note 436 supra.
483. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 5, 1962, p. 25, col. 1.
484. About 10%of those in attendance in the public school. Ibid.
485. The question of whether this program constitutes unconstitutional
financial aid to parochial schools is beyond the scope of this article.
486. For extensive documentation, see PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM 356-67 (1953); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 405, 412-13 (1952).
487. See Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1952).
488. Kauper, Released Time and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply,
53 MICH. L. REV. 233, 236 (1954).
489. "A recent survey showed that members of religious orders in
402 [Vol. 47: 329
RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS
this practice is that "the distinctive garbs, so exclusively peculiar
to the Roman Catholic Church, create a religious atmosphere in
the schoolroom. They have a subtle influence upon the tender
minds being taught and trained by the nuns. In and of themselves
they proclaim the Catholic Church and the representative charact-
er of the teachers in the schoolroom. They silently promulgate sec-
tarianism. ,4 9
0
There is by no means the same general consensus on this
point, however, as there is about those practices previously
discussed. The pressures on the religiously nonconforming child
that are created by his failure to join his colleagues in a par-
ticular activity are absent here. Nor can it be said here, as it was
in connection with Bible reading, that by engaging teachers who
wear religious garb, the state influences the student's freedom of
conscientious choice by placing its "stamp of approval" on the
Roman Catholic faith. It should be clear to students in the upper
grades that when public school teachers are employed, the state
approves only of their intellectual qualifications; the state does not
endorse their sex, political beliefs, or religious affiliations any more
than it sanctions the clothes that they wear or the street on which
they live. As to those students in the lower grades, it would seem
that any influence of the religious garb would not differ substantial-
ly from that produced by the pupils' knowledge of their teacher's
religious devotion acquired elsewhere-from statements the teacher
has made, from religious insignia the teacher wears, or from gen-
eral community information.49' The evidence that this practice is
likely to compromise religious beliefs or influence conscientious
choice is not very strong.
Even if the evidence were more convincing, the practice of per-
mitting teachers to wear religious garb in the schools would not
violate the establishment clause under the proposed constitutional
standard unless it could be fairly characterized as solely religious.
The practice has been defended on the ground "that to prohibit
religious garb were employed as teachers to some extent in the public
schools of sixteen states and territories." Fahy, Religion, Education, and
the Supreme Court, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 73, 89 (1949).
490. Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 809 (Ky. 1956) (dissenting
opinion). See also Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 523-25, 236 P.2d 947,
963-65 (1951); O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421, 428, 77 N.E. 612,
614 (1906); O'Connor v. Hendrick, 109 App. Div. 361, 371-72, 96
N.Y. Supp. 161, 169 (1905); Cosway & Toepfer, Religion and the Schools,
17 U. CINc. L. REv. 117, 138 (1948); Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REv.
888, 893-94 (1955).
491. See Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 657,
30 AdI. 482, 484 (1894); Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law,
36 MARQ. L. REv. 24, 54:-55 (1952).
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a teaching Sister from wearing the garb would infringe the free
exercise of religion."49 If this premise is valid, it would seem to
be a "nonreligious" justification for the practice. However, while
it is quite clear that the Constitution prohibits state discrimination
against its employees on the basis of religion," 3 it is not clear that
the free exercise clause requires the state to permit its teachers to
do anything that their religion demands. 94 Aside from the fact
that barring teachers who wear religious garb from the public
schools would constitute only a rather minor disability,49" 5 there
is some indication that Catholic Sisters may receive dispensation to
wear lay clothing while teaching in the public schools.496 These
being the facts, if further research revealed that the wearing of re-
ligious garb was likely to act as a compromising or influencing
factor, it seems doubtful that the free exercise clause could be read
to prohibit a state from barring religious garb from the public
schools.49 If this be true, the wearing of the garb in the schools
might fairly be characterized as a solely religious practice.
In any case, if it is found that the practice is influential or coer-
cive, it may be that the establishment clause is violated despite the
activity's arguably secular foundation. The secular objective (qual-
ified teachers) may be attained just as well by employing those
who do not wear religious garb and, by so doing, the objection-
able effects would be eliminated. 98 As of now, the factual prem-
ises remain unproven.
The fact that Roman Catholic Sisters contribute their net income
from public school teaching to the church should have no bearing
whatever on the constitutional validity of the practice.499 Persons
should be able to spend their income for any legal purpose. In fact,
the argument may well be made that "to deny the right to make
such contribution would in itself constitute a denial of that right
of religious liberty which the Constitution guarantees. '50
492. Fahy, supra note 489, at 90. But see Commonwealth v. Herr, 229
Pa. 132, 78 AtI. 68 (1910); Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 888, 894 (1955).
493. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952); United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
494. Query if the state could not bar a teacher whose religious faith re-
quired that she proselyte while teaching. See Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo.
808, 816, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (1942).
495. See text accompanying note 410 supra.
496. It has been granted in New York and North Dakota. AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 41ST ANNUAL REPORT 28-29 (1961).
497. See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-07 (1961).
498. See text following note 346 supra.
499. Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Ky. 1956); Zellers v.
Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 522, 236 P.2d 949, 961-62 (1951); Hysong v. Gal-
litzen Borough School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 656-57, 30 Atl. 482, 483-84
(1894).
500. Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 460, 267 N.W. 127, 135 (1936).
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The whole discussion of this subject has dealt only with the
single practice of teachers wearing religious garb. The result sug-
gested here may be different if the totality of the circumstances in
the public school environment, of which the teacher's attire is mere-
ly one element, is likely to compromise or influence the con-
scientious convictions of the students. 50'
E. DISTRIBUTION OF BIBLES
In a recent survey of over 2,000 public school superintendents
throughout the country, over 40 percent admitted that the distribu-
tion of Gideon Bibles to students was permitted through their
schools. °0 This practice is unquestionably solely religious," and
the only two cases considering the problem that have reached the
appellate level have found it to be in violation of the establishment
clause."
There should be no dispute that the King James version of the
Bible, which is the version distributed by the Gideons, is ob-
jectionable to a large number of religious faiths, and that the
scruples of Roman Catholic children will be compromised by re-
ceipt of a copy.5"5 However, one might agree that this activity is,
at best, mildly compulsive on the objectors as compared with some
of those programs previously discussed."° Consider the situation
in Engel; it would seem much less likely that a child, during the
prayer recitation, would leave the room to stand outside with noth-
ing to do,517 than that he would decline acceptance of a Bible.
This would seem particularly true when the procedures for acquisi-
tion of the Bible were carefully drafted so as to avoid the singling
501. See Note, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 888, 890 (1955); text accompany-
ing notes 560-63 infra.
502. Dierenfield, The Extent of Religious Influence in American Public
Schools, 56 RELIGIOUs EDUCATION 173, 175 (1961).
503.
The Gideons International is a nonprofit corporation . . . whose
object is "to -win men and women for the Lord Jesus Christ, through(c) placing the Bible-God's Holy Words--or portions thereof
in hotels, hospitals, schools, institutions, and also through the distribu-
tion of same for personal use."
Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 33, 100 A.2d 857, 858 (1953).
504. Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100
A.2d 857 (1953).
505. See text accompanying note 271 supra.
506. See Levy, Views From the Wall-Reflections on Church-State Re-
lationships, 29 HENNEPIN LAW. 51, 55-56 (1961).
507. In fact, no child requested such permission although it had been
provided for. Brief for Petitioners, p. 31, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421(1962).
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out of nonconformists."' Nonetheless, there has been expert tes-
timony that the program, as administered, generated pressures to
conform." 9 If this factual premise remains unshaken, under the
proposed constitutional standard the practice must cease.
F. SCHOOL CREDIT FOR OUTSIDE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION
It has been reported that "in a number of communities the pub-
lic school-generally at the high school level-will give credit
toward graduation for religious instruction obtained after public
school hours or during week ends under the auspices of the child's
church."51 The purpose and effect of this program-sectarian in-
doctrination-is solely religious. If those students who do not par-
ticipate will have to spend extra time in the public school acquir-
ing these credits while the participants are dismissed, this program
is no different from released time. Nonparticipants will be con-
spicuous and, if in the religious minorities, will be subject to pres-
sures to compromise their beliefs. If there is only minority partici-
pation, the opportunity to avoid public school routine will likely
influence free religious choice. But despite the unquestioned aid
that religion would receive, these results would not follow if the
public school arranged its schedule so that all students, regardless
of whether they participated in outside religious classes, remained
in school during the entire school day. Furthermore, if the school
were to give credit for a number of extra-curricular educational
courses that were of generally equal attractiveness, all pressures
and incentives would seem to be removed, and the program should
pass the proposed constitutional standard.
The fact that some time of public school administrators and
teachers may be taken in insuring that the instruction is being
taken by the students and being given by qualified personnel
must be excused as de minimis 1' However, if the public schools
insist on examining and grading the students on the basis of what
they have learned, 12 the program should probably be invalid. In
such cases, pupils whose religious beliefs differ from those of the
public school teacher will very likely be tempted to learn what they
508. In Tudor, parents simply had to sign a permission slip. Children
whose parents had signed reported to a room "at the close of the session."
No other students were present. No reason was to be stated when the
announcement calling the students was made. 14 N.J. at 34-35, 100 A.2d
at 858-59.
509. 14 N.J. at 50-52, 100 A.2d at 867-68.
510. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 305 (1953).
511. See text accompanying notes 141-47 supra.
512. Cf. State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35
(1918).
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believe will be generally acceptable or at least to assert this for
examination purposes. Such a compromising element should be
barred.
G. BACCALAUREATE AND GRADUATION
Baccalaureate exercises, under public school auspices, are wide-
spread5 13 and have divided communities "with bitter conflict and
tension."514 Many of these programs are "occasions to impart
spiritual truths"51 5 and ordinarily include all the elements of a
Protestant church service-processional hymn, invocation prayer,
choral hymns, Bible reading, address by a clergyman, benediction
prayer, and recessional hymn.16 These must be fairly characteriz-
ed as solely religious activities whether the service is held on public
school or church property. Certain faiths, particularly the Roman
Catholic, forbid participation in exercises of this kind.57 Although
nonparticipation is often permitted,51 it would likely be inef-
fective as far as inherent compulsion is concerned for reasons pre-
viously discussed.519 Thus, since participation would directly com-
promise some students' religious scruples, the establishment clause
would be violated under the proposed constitutional standard.52 0
Of course, this would neither bar the individual churches from con-
ducting baccalaureate services for members of their own faith nor
prevent the public schools from having a nonreligious assembly
program that is called a baccalaureate.
513. Almost 87% of school superintendents polled stated that the activ-
ity was engaged in in their school systems. Dierenfield, The Extent of Re-
ligious Influence in American Public Schools, 56 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
173, 175 (1961).
514. Boyer, Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wisconsin,
1953 Wis. L. REV. 181, 196.
515. Sample comment by public school supervisor, quoted in Dieren-
field, supra note 513, at 179.
516. See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 418 (1953). See
also Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22
U. PITT. L. REv. 561, 573 (1961).
517. Boyer, supra note 514 at 196, 205.
518. See Chamberlin v. Dade County School Bd., 17 Fla. Supp. 183,
197 (Cir. Ct. 1961). However, in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, recent
instances are reported in which nonparticipating Catholic students were
denied public awarding of their diplomas. See AMERICAN CviL LIBER-
TIES UNION, 37TH ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1957); PFEFFER, op. cit. supra
note 516, at 420.
519. However, it may be argued that the pressures on a nonconforming
student to attend a single program are virtually nonexistent, especially when
compared to the pressures generated to participate in an activity that oc-
curs every day or once each week.
520. An opinion of the Attorney General of the state of Washington,
April 20, 1962, agrees. See Jurisdictional Statement, p. 18, Chamberlin
v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, appeal docketed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
3139 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962)(No. 520).
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There have been several reports of public schools conducting their
graduation exercises in church buildings. 2' It this were the only
available site for the occasion, 22 it would be difficult to argue
that this is a solely religious practice. Moreover, if this be the fact,
the alternative argument for establishment clause violation is
likewise inadmissible;123 despite any religious objections to the
practice, the secular objective of having a suitable building may
not be attained by alternative means.
Graduation invocations delivered by clergymen present a some-
what different problem. This part of the graduation program must
be considered as solely religious despite efforts to make it nonsec-
tarian. But there are several reasons why this program may be de-
fended under the proposed constitutional standard. Research has
not revealed that listening to the invocation is contrary to anyone's
religious or conscientious beliefs. If this is true, the practice could
not possibly result in compromising any student's conscientious
scruples. And even if there were some objection, the atmosphere is
not conducive to inherent compulsion to attend the invocation. The
dissenting pupil need not absent himself from the entire program,
and he will likely have the comfort of his parents' and relatives'
presence and will be in the midst of many people outside his peer
group.524 Finally, the fact that this is but a small segment of a
program that a student attends but once makes fairly unpersuasive
the "stamp of approval" argument for influencing religious be-
liefs advanced in connection with daily religious exercises in pub-
lic school classes.525
H. RELIGIOUS INSIGNIA
A North Dakota staute requires "a placard containing the ten
commandments of the Christian religion to be displayed in a con-
spicuous place in every schoolroom, classroom, or other place where
classes convene for instruction. 5 2' Not long ago, a New York
school board passed a resolution that a neutral version of the Ten
521. See State ex rel. Conway v. District Bd., 162 Wis. 482, 156 N.W.
477 (1916); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 34TH ANNUAL REPORT
51 (1954).
522. See Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952).
523. See text following note 346 supra.
524. The situation has been accurately compared to an opening of Con-
gress or a presidential inauguration. Committee on Religion and Public
Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, Relation of
Religion to Public Education-A Study Document, International J. of Re-
ligious Education, Apr. 1960, pp. 21, 29.
525. See State ex rel. Conway v. District Bd., 162 Wis. 482, 495, 156
N.W. 477, 481 (1916).
526. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-10 (1960).
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Commandments, amalgamating and modifying the Jewish, Catholic,
and Protestant versions, be placed in each classroom.' There has
been a proposal in Massachusetts to place the words "In God We
Trust" in every public schoolroom." All of these practices must
be fairly characterized as solely religious," and all of these mot-
toes undoubtedly would be found violative of someone's conscien-
tious scruples." ° Aside from the fact that they arguably violate
the establishment clause because they involve a measurable and
perhaps substantial expenditure of public funds solely in aid of re-
ligion,53' it would seem that they would also fail under the stand-
ard proposed herein.
The identification of the public schools with these religiously
oriented mottoes,5 3 2 constantly in view of immature students with
malleable minds and highest regard for the public school institu-
tion, is likely to result in influencing or compromising their reli-
gious beliefs. 3 This should be contrasted with the placing of a
Christmas creche on the public school lawn that "was not erected
or displayed while school was in session"" 4 and where "no public
funds were expended, nor was the time of any public employee
involved in its erection or display.""5 The compromising or in-
fluencing potential here seems minimal indeed, as it probably also
would if the creche were displayed within the school for a few days
while classes were in session.5 6
527. See Note, 22 ALBANY L. REV. 156 (1958).
528. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 37TH ANNUAL REPORT
64 (1957).
529. The announced purpose of the New York program "was to
strengthen the moral and spiritual values of the students in the school dis-
trict." See Note, 22 ALBANY L. REV. 156 (1958).
530. See ibid. Note that those theses that propose "neutrality" as the
constitutional determinant would seem to permit all of these since there
is no constitutional bar to other symbols such as the American or state
flag or the sign of the Red Cross or Heart Fund. Indeed, this analysis
might well permit the permanent erection of a Crucifix or Star of David
or of any extremely sectarian motto. See note 464 supra.
- 531. See note 182 supra; 3 N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-10 (1960):
"'The superintendent of public instruction may cause such placards to be
printed and may charge an amount therefor that will cover the cost of
printing and distribution."
532. Cf. Note, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 836, 840 (1949).
533. See text accompanying notes 243-46, 291-94 supra.
534. Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14 Misc. 2d 1015, 1019, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230,
236 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
535. Ibid.
536. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 39TH ANNUAL REPORT
39 (1959).
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I. FLAG PLEDGE AND PATRIOTIC SONGS
In 1954, Congress amended the pledge of allegiance to the flag
to include the words "under God." Whether as a general matter this
is unconstitutional is not the question to be considered here. Rather,
the issue is whether a school board's requirement that the pledge
be stated each day in the public schools violates the establishment
clause. This is a difficult question when measured by the proposed
constitutional standard. If the only purpose and effect of the in-
clusion of these words is to have the student recognize the existence
of God and to inculcate religious beliefs, then the words should
be stricken for reasons previously examined. However, it could be
argued that this activity is not solely religious; that, unlike the Re-
gents' prayer that required an invocation of the Deity and a suppli-
cation to God,537 the flag pledge merely requires the recitation
of an historical fact-that this nation was believed to have been
founded "under God" and that most of our people currently be-
lieve this still to be the case. The recitation of the flag pledge
would then be no different from the recitation of Lincoln's Gettys-
burg Address which, while involving the mention of God, does not
demand that the student swear allegiance to Him but merely re-
quires the student to learn American history. On this characteriza-
tion, the activity is secular, and, under the proposed standard, the
establishment clause would not demand its exclusion. If some
student's conscientious beliefs forbid participation, 538 the free ex-
ercise clause demands that he be excused.539 The fact that he may
be inherently compelled to participate is unfortunate but irrele-
vant.5
40
Even accepting this line of argument, the issue may not be
fully resolved. The distinction presented is exceedingly subtle, very
likely too fine to be perceived by even an above-average student.
There is little doubt that the inclusion of the words "under God"
in a daily school exercise will result in compromising of some stu-
dents' conscientious scruples. Therefore, the argument that the es-
tablishment clause is violated because the state may accomplish its
secular purpose-teaching students that the founding fathers and
537. "The 'Regents prayer' is an acknowledgement of our dependence
upon Almighty God and a petition for the bestowal of His blessings."
Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 180, 176 N.E.2d 579, 581 (1961).
538. Objections have been raised. See Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc. 2d 68,
159 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1957), afj'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 447, 207 N.Y.S.
2d 862 (1960).
539. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
540. See text accompanying notes 118-26 supra.
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most citizens believe that this nation exists under God-just as
effectively by less obtrusive means is quite forceful.~'
An even closer question is presented by the public school ac-
tivity of singing certain songs as part of the daily opening exer-
cises. Some very popular patriotic compositions, such as "God Bless
America" and the final stanza of "America, 542 undeniably involve
supplications to the Deity. This is probably true also of any number
of songs. Nevertheless, it seems fair to contend that neither the pur-
pose nor the effect of these is solely religious; the thrust of these
songs is to instill love of country and not love of God. This argu-
ment becomes even more persuasive when the entire content and
spirit of the remaining parts of the opening exercises is nonreligious.
Perhaps this argument stretches the principle a bit. But even ardent
separationists agree that this activity is secular. 3 Therefore, while
the free exercise clause may demand the right of nonparticipation
for students whose scruples forbid them from taking part, under the
proposed standard, the establishment clause does not forbid the
practice. The alternative position for establishment clause violation
may also be satisfied by the contention that, since these songs have
become something of an American tradition, it is doubtful that
the state's secular purpose may be achieved just as effectively with
their elimination. As to the third stanza of "The Star-Spangled
Banner," 5 4 the analysis above is even more forceful, especially
since the words do not involve an invocation to God but are more
like the recitation of historical facts.
J. HOLIDAY OBSERVANCE
The commemoration of certain religious holidays is a very com-
541. See text following note 346 supra.
542.
Our fathers' God! to Thee
Author of Liberty,
To Thee we sing;
Long may our land be bright
With freedom's holy light;
Protect us by Thy might,
Great God, our King!
543. See Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16 RUTGERS L. REV.
735, 750 (1962); cf. McCluskey, quoted in THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 25 (Brown ed. 1958). See also
Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 38
(1962).
544.
Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n rescued land
Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation!
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
And this be our motto---"In God is our Trust."
1963]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mon public school practice." ' Many of the forms that this takes
may not be fairly characterized as solely religious. Nor do many
of these practices lend themselves to student participation. The pre-
sence of these two factors would clearly preclude an establishment
clause violation under the proposed principle. Thus, the placing of
a Christmas tree or an Easter bunny in the public school has vir-
tually no religious significance and, even if it did, its short lived
presence, combined with its scant religious import, would seem to
have minimal effect.
The singing of religious songs and the staging of religious pa-
geants are entirely another matter. While the tenor of some holiday
songs (for example, "White Christmas" and "Jingle Bells") and
of some plays (for example, Dickens' "Christmas Carol") is quite
clearly associated with our people's culture rather than with their
religious beliefs,546 this cannot fairly be said of those whose lan-
guage and purport is Christological, devotional, or otherwise reli-
gious. The evidence of the inherent compulsion on members of re-
ligious minorities to participate in these songs and pageants is sub-
stantial. At a school in which Jewish children were in the majority,
a sixth grade pupil asked to be excused from the singing of Christ-
mas hymns;54 7 after class, she "was belabored by her classmates
with such epithets as 'Christ-killer who refuses to sing hymns to
Jesus Christ.' "54 In reaction to or in anticipation of such occur-
rences, "many Jewish children, with the blend of ingenuousness and
ingenuity natural to their age, .-. . often engage in one or another
subterfuge to produce the appearance of cooperation in the school
celebration without at the same time genuinely participating in vio-
lation of their religious convictions."'" 9 The emotional ambivalence
545. A recent study showed that Christmas was celebrated in 88% of the
public schools polled; Easter, 58%; Hanukkah, 5%; Passover, 2%. Dieren-
field, The Extent of Religious Influence in American Public Schools, 56
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 173, 176-77 (1961).
546. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 214 (Barnhart ed. 1959)
gives, as a definition of Christmas: "Dec. 25 (Christmas Day), now gen-
erally observed as an occasion for gifts, greetings, etc." See also PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 407 (1953); Rosenfield, Separation of
Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. PITT. L. REV. 561, 573
(1961).
547. Cf. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 546, at 406:
Nor can any non-Jew rightfully assert that such singing ["Come, let
us adore Him, Christ the Lord," or "Born is the King of Israel"]
will not violate the Jewish child's religious conscience, any more than
the school principals in the 19th century could rightfully assert that
the Catholic child's religious conscience would not be violated by read-
ing from the King James Bible.
548. Id. at 407.
549. PFEFFER & BAUM, PUBLIC SCHOOL SECTARIANISM AND THE JEW-
ISH CHILD 6 (1957). See examples cited id. at 7-9; Franck, quoted in
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that this produces is quite obvious. No doubt, many less determin-
ed children fully sacrifice their religious scruples by joining their
colleagues. These solely religious activities that require student par-
ticipation, whether it be the singing of hymns or the acting in plays,
are likely to result in compromising conscientious convictions.5
Nor is the practice validated under the establishment clause by cele-
brating the holidays of a greater number of religious faiths. Since
religious leaders of all faiths have objected to this,"' it would
only seem to compound the difficulty.
Nothing that has been said would deter examination, in the pub-
lic school curriculum, of certain aspects of religious holidays as an
academic matter. Thus, the singing and learning of religious
hymns in a music class, as part of the study of different types of
musical compositions, must be fairly characterized as secular ac-
tivity.52 Likewise, the occasional showing of motion pictures that
depict various religious happenings may be of considerable edu-
cational value,51 and, even if not, the quantum of participation
required would be so slight that it is unlikely that the compromis-
ing or influencing of conscientious scruples would occur. This last
instance is to be contrasted with a public school group activity of
making religious cut-outs to be pasted on the schoolroom windows
and walls." Here, the element of inherent compulsion seems
quite powerful, and under the proposed constitutional standard, if
the children were required to make only religiously significant pic-
tures, and this practice were contrary to their religious beliefs, the
establishment clause would be violated.
K. PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN PAROCHIAL BUILDINGS
In a small percentage of school districts throughout the count-
ry, public school classes are held in church owned buildings. "
THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 60
(Brown ed. 1958); Gilbert, A Catalogue of Church-State Problems, 56
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 424, 429 (1961).
550. But see Levy, Views From the Wall-Reflections on Church-State
Relationships, 29 HENNEPIN LAW. 51, 56 (1961).
551. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 546, at 410-12; AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 41ST ANNU-AL REPORT 27-28 (1961).
552. See Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16 RUTGERS L. REv.
735, 750 (1962).
553. But see Chamberlin v. Dade County School Bd., 17 Fla. Supp. 183,
196 (Cir. Ct. 1961).
554. Cf. Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L.
REv. 1306, 1344 (1949).
555. Dierenfield, The Extent of Religious Influence in American Pub-
lic Schools, 56 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 173, 177 (1961), reports almost
8%.
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This practice has spawned a good deal of litigation in the state
courts. If the practice involves no more than the school board's
renting the only available property," 6 it may hardly be fairly
characterized as solely religious. Thus, there would be no violation
of the establishment clause, either under the proposed constitution-
al standard or under the alternative test previously discussed.57
The fact that the school rooms have religious pictures and decora-
tions55 would possibly not alter these conclusions, despite the
fact that their placement in an ordinary public school would be
objectionable; if, irrespective of the religious decor, the church
building is still found to be the best available space, the issue is
entirely different. 59 It may be reasonably argued that no matter
how great the amount of religious infusion in the environment
due to quasi-control by the church, the school board's practice of us-
ing parochial buildings cannot be said to be solely religious, either
in purpose or in effect; in each instance, it is the considered judg-
ment of the public school board that, on balance, these are the
best available facilities for public education. Perhaps this would
immunize the practice under the proposed standard.
This may not be the case in regard to the alternative criterion
for establishment clause violation. It is ultimately the function of
the Court to determine whether "on balance, these are the best
available facilities" and whether the secular end may not be at-
tained by less objectionable means. It has been suggested that the
solution here is: "that which is legally tolerable ends where the re-
ligious infusion becomes unreasonably great."' 65 But certain
guidelines may be established. Public officials should not be per-
mitted to abdicate their responsibility of selecting teachers and
textbooks to clerical authorities.5"' The potentiality for uncheck-
ed religious indoctrination of public school students in these cir-
556. See Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 806-07 (Ky. 1956).
557. See text accompanying note 523 supra.
558. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 359, 28 N.E.2d
256, 261 (1940).
559. This line of argument assumes, of course, that the pictures and
decorations are there without the consent of the public school officials.
If they had control over these matters, then the retention of these decora-
tions could be accurately described as a solely religious activity.
560. Sutherland, Public Authority and Religious Education: A Brief
Survey of Constitutional and Legal Limits, in THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 33, 43 (Brown ed. 1958).
561. See Millard v. Board of Educ., 121 Ill. 297, 301, 10 N.E. 669,
671 (1887); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 358, 28
N.E.2d 256, 261 (1940); Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 364 Mo.
121, 130, 260 S.W.2d 573, 576 (1953). Compare Crain v. Walker, 222
Ky. 828, 839, 2 S.W.2d 654, 659 (1928).
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cumstances would seem so great that no justification for it
should be held acceptable, perhaps even if the result is tanta-
mount to the temporary suspension of the so-called "public" educa-
tion. The same, of course, must be said if the result of the use of
the parochial buildings is compulsory religious teaching.5" In
such cases, the Court should find that alternative means (for ex-
ample, construction of an independent public school building
or arranging for public education in another school district)
must be used to accomplish the secular end of providing a public
education. Even if the Constitution permits the use of public funds
to aid parochial education, this is no authority for the proposition
that the state may demand that children of all faiths who wish a
"public education" attend a publicly supported institution that is
essentially no different from a parochial school.
On the other hand, if the unalterable consequences of using
church property for public education are that the schools, granting
the right of nonparticipation, engage in certain solely religious
practices such as prayers and worship in daily chapel exercises,
or programs of religious instruction akin to released time,' the
Court should place a heavy burden on the state to demonstrate
that less objectionable means do not exist. Otherwise, all the pro-
tections afforded religious liberty in the public schools that have
been discussed may be easily circumvented by turning over some of
the control of public education to the clergy of a particular re-
ligious faith.5 66
562. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 703, 166 N.W.
202, 206 (1918); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 811, 163 S.W.2d 609,
610 (1942); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 506, 236 P.2d 949, 952 (1951);
Boyer, Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wisconsin, 1953
WIs. L. REV. 181, 217-225.
563. See cases cited note 562 supra.
564. See Williams v. Board of Trustees, 172 Ky. 133, 134, 188 S.W.
1058 (1916); Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 364 Mo. 121, 131-
32, 260 S.W.2d 573, 577-78 (1953).
565. See Millard v. Board of Educ., 121 MI1. 297, 302, 10 N.E. 669,
671 (1887); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 359, 28 N.E.2d
256, 261-62 (1940); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 507-08, 236 P.2d
949, 953 (1951); Boyer, supra note 562.
566. Cf. Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 725-26, 166 N.W.
202, 213 (1918):
[W]henever the adherents of any particular creed can command a
majority of any school board, it may abandon the schoolhouse pro-
vided for the common and equal use of all the people, move the school
into some church or some parochial or private building established
for sectarian use, put in charge of it trained ecclesiastics bound by
solemn vows to devote their lives, their services, and all their God-
given powers to the advancement of the interest of their church, fill
the school with distinctive emblems of their faith, and by a multitude
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has not been to reconcile the myriad
of state court decisions involving the problems of religion and the
public schools. There has been no attempt to demonstrate the ex-
istence of an internal consistency even within the very few cases
decided by the Supreme Court. Nor has the endeavor been to pre-
dict the outcome of future litigation. While the recent decision in
Engel v. Vitale has been examined, it has not been suggested that
the case permits of only one interpretation. Rather, the purpose
here has been to submit a rational and desirable standard for con-
stitutional adjudication in this area, and to demonstrate its applica-
tion in some specific situations. In many of these instances, "nice"
distinctions have been drawn. But a "boundary line is none the
worse for being narrow."5 ' It should be made clear that "the
principle offered is meant to provide a starting point for solutions
to problems brought before the Court, not a mechanical answer to
them. 5 68 If some of the underlying factual premises advanced
here are shown to be incorrect, the results suggested must be
changed. But the principle should be adhered to.
Central to the theme of this article has been the fact that it is
vital to the preservation of religious liberty to recognize that al-
though "you send your child to the schoolmaster . . . 'tis the
schoolboys who educate him." '69 Voluntariness is a concept, not
merely a word. "Compulsion which comes from circumstances
can be as real as compulsion which comes from a command. °7 0
If the price for the protection of religious liberty in the public
schools is the abolition of certain religious influences,571 that price
must be paid. Although this conclusion may be said to manifest
no more than "the traditional American weakness of identifying
our own preferences and predilections with the Constitution, '572
the effort has been made to submerge these preferences and pre-
dilections in favor of historical and contemporary national goals.
of influences, silent as well as expressed, shape the plastic minds and
characters of the young children committed to their care in accordance
with their own religious views, and saddle the expense of this sectarian
education upon the taxpayers.
567. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 329 (1944).
568. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1961).
569. EMERSON, THE CONDUCT OF LIFE 123 (1860).
570. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1962) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
571. See Kirven, Freedom of Religion or Freedom from Religion?, 48
A.B.A.J. 816, 819 (1962).
572. Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 829, 848 (1954).
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